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The Case for a Duty to Rescue*
Ernest J. Weinribt
No observer would have any difficulty outlining the current state
of the law throughout the common-law world regarding the duty
to rescue. Except when the person endangered and the potential
rescuer are linked in a special relationship, there is no such duty.'
This general rule rests on the law's distinction between the inflic-
tion of harm and the failure to prevent it. The distinction between
misfeasance and nonfeasance in turn reflects deeply rooted intui-
tions about causation, and it has played a critical role in the devel-
opment of the common-law notions of contract and tort and of the
boundary between them. In large part because this distinction is so
fundamental to the common law, the courts have uniformly re-
fused to enunciate a general duty to rescue,2 even in the face of
repeated criticisms that the absence of such a duty is callous.
3
* I would like to thank Professor Charles Fried of Harvard University and my colleagues
Professor A. S. Weinrib and Professor S. A. Schiff for commenting on earlier drafts of this
article.
t Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
1. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 338-43 (4th ed. 1971) (special relation-
ships include husband-wife, shipmaster-crew, proprietor-customer, carrier-passenger, edu-
cator-pupil, and employer-employee); Note, The Duty to Rescue, 47 IND. L.J. 321, 321 & n.3
(1972) (same).
For the law in non-common-law jurisdictions, see Feldbrugge, Good and Bad Samaritans: A
Comparative Survey of Criminal Law Provisions Concerning Failure to Rescue, 14 Am. J. Comp. L.
630 (1966); Rudzinski, The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis, in THE GOOD SAmARrTAN
AND THE LAW 91 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966); Note, Stalking the Good Samaritan: Communists, Capi-
talists and the Duty to Rescue, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 529.
Cases from Canadian and British jurisdictions serve as the principal illustrations in this
article, but the relevant American case law is noted throughout.
2. See, e.g., Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 44 A. 809 (1897); Home Office v.
Dorset Yacht Co., [1970] A.C. 1004, 1029-30 (H.L.) (Lord Reid).
3. For several of the criticisms of the common-law rule, see note 17 infra (citing
sources).
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Nonetheless, recent developments, both judicial and academic, jus-
tify a reconsideration of the common-law position.
On the judicial side, many of the outposts of the doctrine that
there is no general duty to rescue have fallen. Recognizing the
meritoriousness of rescue and the desirability of encouraging it,
the courts have increasingly accorded favorable treatment to in-
jured rescuers. When a rescuer sues for compensation for his inju-
ries, voluntary assumption of risk cannot be interposed as a de-
fense,4 contributory negligence comes into play only if the plaintiff
has been reckless, 5 and a broad range of rescue attempts are
deemed reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.6 Moreover, the
courts have increased the number of special relationships that re-
quire one person to aid another in peril.7 These developments
have made the general absence of a duty to rescue seem more ec-
centric and isolated. 8 They have also raised the possibility that the
general rule is in the process of being consumed and supplanted by
the widening ambit of the exceptions9 and that the relationship be-
tween the general rule and the exceptions may be fundamentally
incoherent.
4. See Haynes v. Harwood, [1935] 1 K.B. 146 (C.A.); cf. Perpich v. Leetonia Mining
Co., 118 Minn. 508, 512, 137 N.W. 12, 14 (1912) (rescuer may recover from imperiled
person for injuries sustained in rescue attempt, unless rescuer acted with extreme reckless-
ness); Echert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871) (same).
5. See Horsley v. MacLaren, 22 D.L.R.3d 545, 558 (Can. 1971) (no contributory negli-
gence of rescuer absent recklessness); J. FLEMING, THE LAw OF TORTS 159 (4th ed. 1971)
(contributory negligence not good defense unless rescue foolhardy).
6. See Hammonds v. Haven, 280 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. 1955) (jury question whether pedes-
trian's assumption of dangerous position on road to warn drivers of hazard was reason-
able); Guca v. Pittsburgh Rys., 367 Pa. 579, 583, 80 A.2d 779, 781 (1951) (reasonable to
stand on railroad tracks to warn of car stuck in tracks); H. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION
IN THE LAW 239 (1959) (rescuer may recover where there is little practical foreseeability of
his injury); Fleming, Remoteness and Duty: The Control Devices in Liability for Negligence, 31
CAN. B. REv. 471, 486 (1953) (limits of foreseeability have been stretched to encourage res-
cue attempts); Linden, Down with Foreseeability: Of Thin Skulls and Rescuers, 47 CAN. B. REv.
544 (1969) (same).
7. There are several recent examples. See, e.g., Anderson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,
333 U.S. 821, 823 (1948) (employer-employee); Devlin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 235 F.
Supp. 882, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (proprietor-customer); Pridgen v. Boston Hous. Auth.,
364 Mass. 696, 308 N.E.2d 467 (1974) (landlord-trespasser); Farwell v. Keaton, 396 Mich.
281, 290-91, 240 N.W.2d 217, 221-22 (1976) (companion-companion); O'Rourke v.
Schacht, I Can. S. Ct. 53 (1976) (police officer-driver); Horsley v. MacLaren, 22 D.L.R.3d
545, 552 (Can. 1971) (boat operator-passenger).
8. See Horsley v. MacLaren, 22 D.L.R.3d 545, 557 (Can. 1971) (Laskin, J.) ("The evolu-
tion of the law on this subject [the compensation of injured rescuers], originating in the
moral approbation of assistance to a person in peril, involved a break with the 'mind your
own business' philosophy.")
9. See Caldwell v. Bechtel, 631 F.2d 989, 1000 (D.D.C. 1980) (recent holdings "suggest
that courts have been eroding the general rule that there is no duty to act to help another




On the academic side, recent writing has given new life to the de-
bate on rescue. Professor Coase's approach, for example, implies
that, from an economic point of view, the distinction between mis-
feasance and nonfeasance that supports the common-law rule is
without significance. For Coase, the real issue is whether the al-
leged tortfeasor is to be allowed to impose the cost. of his physical
activity on the plaintiff, or whether the plaintiff, by his invoca-
tion of the legal process, will be allowed to harm the alleged tort-
feasor.' ° For this approach, only the resulting distribution of costs
matters; whether this result is accomplished by the defendant's
operations in the physical world or by the plaintiff's operations
in the legal world is not itself important. The refusal to accord
a special recognition to the role of the court, and the assimilation
of the court to an agency for the distribution of costs, has im-
plications for the position of a person seeking judicial interven-
tion. Because distinctions based on causation are obliterated in
Coase's model of reciprocal harm, a plaintiff can claim no special
consideration as the victim of another's action, and a defendant
does not necessarily escape liability because the harm complained
of was not caused by any of his actions. The causal nihilism of
Coase's world,'1 which has its roots in utilitarian thought extending
back to Bentham,'12 thus subverts the misfeasance-nonfeasance dis-
tinction and changes the terms on which the rescue problem is dis-
cussed.
13
The most important critics of the economic approach to law have
all in their various ways been concerned with rehabilitating causa-
tion as a central feature of law and morals.14 It is the work of Pro-
fessor Epstein,' 5 among this group of scholars, that is of particular
10. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960).
11. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 592 (1978).
12. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
74-83 (J. Burns & H. Hart eds. 1970).
13. For an example of consequentialist analysis in the economic mode, see R. POSNER,
ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.8, at 76-77 (1972). The relationship between utilitarianism
and Posner's principle of wealth-maximization, as well as the normative validity of Posner's
approach, are currently the subject of controversy. See Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and
Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 221 (1980);
Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8
HOFSTRA L. REv. 487 (1980); Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103 (1979); Weinrib, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 30 U. TORONTO L.J.
307 (1980); Symposium-Change in the Common Law: Legal and Economic Perspectives, 9 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 189 (1980).
14. E.g., G. FLETCHER, supra note 11; C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978); Epstein, De-
fences and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 167 (1974);
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 160-89 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Epstein Theory]; Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1972).
15. Epstein Theory, supra note 14, at 189-204.
249
The Yale Law Journal
importance in connection with rescue. For Professor Epstein, cau-
sation is so pivotal a notion in a legal system that values liberty that
it is not only a basis of liability in tort, but the only basis of liability
in tort. This emphasis on causation has its roots in ethical thought
leading back not to Bentham's utilitarianism but to Kant's injunc-
tion against treating other persons as means rather than as ends,"
a principle that seems to presuppose an idea of acting upon others
that does not encompass nonfeasance. Relying on this tradition for
his critique of the economic approach, Eptstein has argued that the
absence of a general duty to rescue is not an unfortunate fossil of a
more barbaric age but is a morally defensible thread in the overall
fabric of the common law.
Critics of the common-law position have generally proposed that
the courts ought to recognize a duty to effect what might be
termed an easy rescue, that is, a duty that would arise whenever
one person is caught in a dangerous situation that another can alle-
viate at no significant cost to himself.17 The requirements of emer-
gency and lack of prejudice distinguish the proposed obligation to
rescue from the usual tort duties connected with misfeasance: the
latter duties can be present in routine situations and can impose
considerable costs on those who are subject to them. The recent ju-
dicial and academic developments bear upon this proposal in di-
verse ways. The tort decisions that recognize the distinctive merit
of the rescuer stand in easy harmony with the proposed duty. The
academic writings, on the other hand, seem incompatible with a
duty of easy rescue. The Coasian framework would reject the re-
strictions on the duty because these restrictions acknowledge the
fundamental character of the distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance. For Epstein, by contrast, the difference between non-
feasance and misfeasance is fundamental, but the chasm between
these two concepts is so deep that only duties respecting misfea-
sance can be accommodated within the common law of torts. The
16. I. KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS 62 (10th ed. T.
Abbott trans. 1955).
17. E.g., J. BENTHAM, supra note 12, at 292-93 ("The limits of the law on this head seem
. to be capable of being extended a good deal farther than they seem to have been ex-
tended hitherto. In particular, in cases where the person is in danger, why should it not be
made the duty of every man to save another from mischief, when it can be done without
prejudicing himself, as well as to abstain from bringing it on him?"); see M. SHAPO, THE
DUTY TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY at xii, 64-68 (1978); Ames, Law and
Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 92, 113 (1908); Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue, 25 STAN. L.
REV. 51 (1972); Rudolf, The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44 NEB. L. REV. 499, 509 (1965).
For recent legislation in the province of Quebec, see Barakett & Jobin, Une Modeste Loi
du Bon Samaritain pour le Quebec, 54 CAN. B. REv. 290 (1976).
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proposed duty to rescue thus seems to be unacceptable both from
an instrumentalist and from a Kantian point of view.
This article sets forth an argument in favor of a judicially created
duty to effect an easy rescue. Because any special principle about
rescue presupposes the distinction between misfeasance and non-
feasance, section I delineates this distinction and shows how it in-
forms the policies behind the general common-law rule on rescue
and some of the special-relationship exceptions. Section II sets
forth and analyzes the arguments that have been offered, espe-
cially by Professor Epstein, against a generalized legal duty to res-
cue. This analysis, having highlighted the legal and ethical issues
central to the argument against such a duty, clears the ground for
the argument for the recognition by the common law of a duty of
easy rescue. Section III argues that our moral intuitions are re-
flected in a coherent and growing pattern in the common law, a
pattern indicating that the understanding of liberty in a market so-
ciety does not preclude a legal obligation to rescue. Finally, section
IV turns to the philosophic aspects of this pattern; it argues that a
general duty of easy rescue can find support either on Benthamite-
utilitarian or Kantian-deontological grounds. The article argues, in
sum, that a duty of easy rescue would strengthen an already-broad
pattern of common-law principles and that such a duty can plausi-
bly be justified within both of the ethical traditions that inform the
common-law system.
I. The Distinction Between Misfeasance and Nonfeasance
In his classic essay of 1908, Professor Francis H. Bohlen pointed
out that "misfeasance differs from nonfeasance in two respects; in
the character of the conduct complained of, and second, in the na-
ture of the detriment suffered in consequence thereof."'" With re-
spect to the first difference, Bohlen asserted that the distinction be-
tween active and passive misconduct is, though in practice difficult
to draw, in theory obvious. About the second difference Bohlen
was more specific. In cases of misfeasance, the victim's position is
changed for the worse through the creation of a negative quantity
in the form of a positive loss or new harm. In cases of nonfeasance,
on the other hand, there is merely a failure to benefit the victim,
which is a loss only in the sense that a positive quantity is not
added.
18. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REv. 217,
220 (1908).
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Bohlen stated these distinctions in skeletal form only, without
providing the elaboration they require. For instance, the use of
positive and negative quantities to explain the difference in the na-
ture of the detriment presupposes not only a computational ledger
but also a baseline with reference to which the computation is per-
formed. Bohlen seems to have assumed that the baseline was the
victim's position immediately prior to the incident that gives rise to
the litigation, as when the victim of an automobile accident com-
plains of the loss of a previously healthy limb. Since Bohlen's time,
however, tort law has come to permit the imposition of liability for
injuries that are not most naturally described as the loss of something
actually possessed at an earlier time. A plaintiff, for example, can
recover for economic injury not only when he has lost funds that
he previously had, 19 but also when the loss represents a potential
profit that he had not yet realized.20 Similarly, when an infant sues
for prenatal injuries, recovery does not depend on whether the in-
jury was inflicted on a limb that was already formed or whether the
injury prevented the formation of a limb.
21
Bohlen's other distinction, that concerned with the character of
the misconduct, also needs elaboration. Bohlen himself acknowl-
edged one of the problems when he pointed to the practical diffi-
culties of characterizing behavior having elements of both active
and passive misconduct. An illustration of this borderland situation
is the old case of Newton v. Ellis,22 in which the plaintiff sued for in-
juries received at night when passing his carriage by a hole in the
highway that the defendant had excavated but had failed to light.
The court viewed the digging of the hole and the failure to light it
as one complex act rather than as two separate events, one an act,
the other a failure to act. Bohlen would have agreed, 23 but his dis-
tinction does not explain why one should prefer one characteriza-
tion of the situation to the other. For principled use by courts, the
unelaborated distinction between active and passive conduct is in-
adequate.24
19. See Giuliano Constr. Co. v. Simmons, 147 Conn. 441, 162 A.2d 511 (1960);
Bankston v. Dumont, 205 Miss. 272, 38 So. 2d 721 (1949); Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller &
Partners, [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.).
20. See Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 214 N.W. 754 (1927); Rivtow
Marine v. Washington Iron Works, 40 D.L.R.3d 530 (Can. 1973); Spartan Steel & Alloys v.
Martin & Co., [1972] 3 All E.R. 557 (C.A.).
21. See Watt v. Rama, [1972] Vict. 353 (S. Ct.); Duval v. Seguin, 40 D.L.R.3d 666 (Ont.
C.A. 1973). For recovery for injuries that are not only pre-natal but pre-conceptional, see
Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 40 Ili. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976).
22. 119 Eng. Rep. 424 (K.B. 1855).
23. Bohlen, supra note 18, at 220 n.6.
24. Nonfeasance is not equivalent to the nonperformance of an act in one recognized
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To begin elucidating the distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance, consider the following fairly clear and extreme para-
digmatic situations:
A. An automobile driver (defendant) fails to apply his brakes
in time, and a pedestrian (plaintiff) is thereby hurt.
B. One person (defendant) sees another (plaintiff) drowning
in a pool of water and refuses to toss him an easily availa-
ble rope.
In both cases there has been a failure to act: in A, a failure to press
the brakes; in B, a failure to toss the rope. Yet A and B are not
both instances of nonfeasance.25 On an intuitive understanding of
causation, the defendant in A caused the injury, whereas the de-
fendant in B did not. On one of tort law's prime understandings of
causation, however, that conclusion is problematic. In both A and
B, the defendants are but-for causes of injury: neither the injury in
A nor the drowning in B would have happened had the defen-
dants not failed to act in the specified ways.
The but-for test of factual causation first focuses on the time at
which the defendant failed to act to prevent harm to the plaintiff,
then compares the actual course of events after that time with a hy-
pothetical course of events for the same subsequent period. Within
that temporal framework, the structures of A and B are identical.
What differentiates A from B is the course of events prior to the
starting point. In B, there was no significant interaction between
the plaintiff and the defendant in that earlier period: when en-
countered by the defendant, the plaintiff was already exposed to
danger. In A, by contrast, the defendant, in the antecedent period,
sense of the word "act." Tort theory defines an "act" as a voluntary muscular contraction
or as an external manifestation of the will. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 54 (1881);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2 (1965). Though primitive, see G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT
OF MIND 62 (1949); Fitzgerald, Voluntary and Involuntary Acts, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURIS-
PRUDENCE 1 (A. Guest ed. 1961), these definitions capture a basic feature of our notions of
responsibility by setting as a minimal condition of liability the defendant's ability to avoid
inflicting the harm that his behavior has caused. Thus, no liability attaches to a person who
has been carried forcibly onto another's land, Smith v. Stone, 82 Eng. Rep. 533 (K.B.
1647), or has injured another while unconscious, Stokes v. Carlson, 362 Mo. 93, 240
S.W.2d 132 (1951); Slattery v. Haley, [1923] 3 D.L.R. 156 (Ont. App. Div.). A defendant
who is pleading nonfeasance, however, has performed an act in this narrow sense. Indeed
his act may have been quite callously deliberate, as when an employer vindictively refuses
to make an elevator available to employees who wish to emerge from a mine. Herd v.
Weardale Steel, Coal, & Coke Co., [1913] 3 K.B. 771 (C.A.), affd, [1915] A.C. 67 (H.L.).
A defendant in a nonfeasance case, then, can concede that in one sense he has acted and
yet argue that in a second sense he has not acted.
25. But see Kelly v. Metropolitan Ry., [1895] 1 Q.B. 944 (negligence may be by action or
by inaction).
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played a part in the creation of the very danger that he subse-
quently failed to abate. To treat A as identical to B is thus to start
in medias res. Situations like A, in which misfeasance masquerades
as nonfeasance, have aptly been categorized as "pseudo-non-
feasance.
26
Action can be variously described, and pseudo-nonfeasance is
one instance of the technique of distorting the description by fo-
cusing on only one of the phases of an action.27 This technique was
presented in Newton v. Ellis,28 where the defendant argued that the
gravamen of the suit was the failure to put up a light rather than
the digging of the hole in the highway. This argument would have
equated the excavator of the hole with the rest of the world by
confining judicial attention to a phase subsequent to that in which
the defendant established a unique relationship with the particular
hole and thereby with all passing drivers. Although not all courts
are sensitive to the dynamics of pseudo-nonfeasance, 29 the court in
this case was alert to the distorting technique and insisted upon
looking at the excavator's behavior in its entirety.30
The difference between real nonfeasance and pseudo-non-
feasance can be formulated by transforming the but-for test so that
it attends not to the actual injury but to the risk of injury. In this
view, situation B is a case of real nonfeasance because the risk of
drowning existed independent of the defendant's presence or ab-
sence; the defendant's part in the materialization of the risk has no
bearing on this fact. Situation A, by contrast, is a case of pseudo-
26. McNeice & Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272, 1272-73 (1949).
27. The philosopher J. L. Austin described the various ways of dividing an action as
follows:
[W]hat is an or one or the action? For we can generally split up what might be named
as one action in several distinct ways, into different stretches or phases or stages. Stages
have already been mentioned: we can dismantle the machinery of the act, and describe
(and excuse) separately the intelligence, the appreciation, the planning, the decision,
the execution and so forth. Phases are rather different: we can say that he painted a
picture or fought a campaign, or else we can say that first he laid on this stroke of
paint and then that, first he fought this action and then that. Stretches are different
again: a single term descriptive of what he did may be made to cover either a smaller
or a larger stretch of events, those excluded by the narrower description being then
called 'consequences' or 'results' or 'effects' or the like of his act.
J. AUSTIN, A Plea for Excuses, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 123, 149 (1961).
28. 119 Eng. Rep. 424 (K.B. 1855).
29. See, e.g., Miller & Brown Ltd. v. City of Vancouver, 59 D.L.R.2d 640 (B.C.C.A.
1966) (failure of defendant to lop off bough of tree he planted held to be nonfeasance).
30. Newton v. Ellis, 119 Eng. Rep. 424, 428 (K.B. 1855) (Erle, J.) ("Here the cause of
action is the making of the hole, compounded with a not putting up a light. When these
are blended, the result is no more than if two positive acts were committed, such as
digging the hole and throwing out the dirt: the two would make up one act."); cf. id. at
427-28 (Coleridge, J.) (actions constitute one complex act).
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nonfeasance because the defendant's driving of his car was a fac-
tual cause of the plaintiff's exposure to the risk of the injury that
he suffered. In Newton v. Ellis, for example, the danger of falling
into the excavator's hole would not have existed but for the de-
fendant's having dug it.
Distinguishing misfeasance from nonfeasance on the basis of the
defendant's participation in the creation of the risk is adequate not
only for the extreme situations of A and B but also for more com-
plicated situations. In particular, because this formulation of the
distinction focuses on the defendant's having had some role in the
creation of the risk, and not on the quality of that role, the defend-
ant's fault in creating the risk is irrelevant to the decision whether
a case is one of nonfeasance or not. Fault, of course, is relevant to
the decision whether the defendant is liable, but the fault need not
attach in the phase of risk creation; rather, it might be found in the
subsequent phase, when the defendant failed to abate the risk.
Consider the following situations, in which the faulty conduct at is-
sue is intentional:
C. An automobile driver (defendant) intentionally drives
onto another's (plaintiff's) foot and leaves the car there.
D. An automobile driver (defendant) without fault drives
onto another's (plaintiff's) foot, but when he becomes
aware of his action, he refuses to remove his car.31
In D, the defendant might argue that the court should assess his
conduct only from the time of his refusal to move the car, and that
from that perspective, the car's position on the plaintiff's foot was
an unfortunate happenstance for which he was not at fault. This
argument, like the one put forward in situation A, equates the de-
fendant with all bystanders by ignoring the distinctive role of the
defendant in bringing about the tortious contact between car and
foot. The defendants in both C and D participated in the creation
of the plaintiff's peril and intended the consequent harm to the
plaintiffs. The only difference is one of sequence: in D the intent
followed, whereas in C it preceded, the arrival of the automobile
on the plaintiff's foot. The law recognizes this difference by
refusing in D to impose liability on the defendant for harm caused
during the period between the initial contact and the formation of
his intention to continue it.
The same analysis can be applied to cases of negligence. In Oke v.
31. A similar situation was presented in Fagan v. Commissioner of Metropolitan Police,
[1969] 1 Q.B. 439.
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Weide Transport Ltd. and Carra,32 the defendant driver, without
fault, knocked down a traffic sign, embedding the metal post in the
ground. The next day, another driver drove over the post and was
impaled. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in
failing to report the dangerous road condition to the police. On the
analysis of nonfeasance under consideration, this case is essentially
similar to Newton v. Ellis, which also concerned a failure by the de-
fendant to abate a dangerous highway condition that he had cre-
ated. The only difference is that in Newton, the defendant inten-
tionally created the condition requiring abatement, whereas in Oke
the defendant created the peril without fault. The defendant in
Oke is exempt from liability for damage to the sign, of course, but
with respect to liability to the injured driver, his position is identical
to that of the defendant in Newton: each was negligent in failing to
alleviate a danger that he himself had created. To ignore the de-
fendant's role in creating the peril would be to equate the position
of the defendant with that of any other motorist who happened to
pass by and notice the danger. Those members of the court in Oke
who considered the nonfeasance issue explicitly refused to make
this equation.33
Participation by the defendant in the creation of the risk, even
if such participation is innocent, is thus the crucial factor in
distinguishing misfeasance from nonfeasance.3 4 The law's ac-
knowledgement of the importance of this factor is clear in some
contexts, oblique in others. For instance, some statutes require a
driver who is involved in an accident to offer assistance to its vic-
32. 41 D.L.R.2d 53 (Man. C.A. 1963). For comparable cases, see Simonsen v. Thorin,
120 Neb. 684, 234 N.W. 628 (1931); Montgomery v. National Convoy & Trucking Co., 186
S.C. 167, 195 S.E. 247 (1937).
33. Oke v. Weide Transport Ltd. & Carra, 41 D.L.R.2d 53, 62-63 (Man. C.A. 1963)
(Freedman, J.A., dissenting). The majority held that there was no negligence in failing to
report because the victim's death happened under such extraordinary circumstances that it
was not reasonably foreseeable. This holding eliminated the need to decide whether there
was a duty to report the condition of the sign. The validity of the dissenting opinion's ap-
proach to the nonfeasance issue has been supported by Rivtow Marine v. Washington Iron
Works, 40 D.L.R.3d 530 (Can. 1973), where the Supreme Court of Canada held that the
manufacturer of a defective item that causes economic loss is beyond the reach of liability
for negligence in manufacturing it, but that he is under a duty to abate the danger thus
created by warning of the defect when he becomes aware of it.
34. In cases that focus on the materialization of risk, the "but-for" test must be supple-
mented by consideration of substantiality and remoteness. Similarly, where the creation of
risk is at issue, supplementary factors are also needed. Otherwise, a worker whose labor
contributed to the manufacture of an automobile will have his behavior placed within the
category of misfeasance if he fails to aid a person injured by that automobile. Considera-
tions of remoteness and substantiality are currently of no practical importance, however,
because the courts have erred on the side of an excessively restrictive view of misfeasance,
see notes 31 & 33 supra, rather than an excessively expansive one.
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tims regardless of his fault in causing the accident. 35 Courts also
frequently hold occupiers of land liable for failure to abate the
dangers to which their use of the land has innocently exposed oth-
ers, at least where the injured party is an invitee. 36 In addition, the
common law now imposes a duty on the captain of a vessel to res-
cue a sailor or passenger who falls overboard. For many years, the
law exonerated the captain who neglected to rescue as long as the
need to rescue arose without his fault. 37 Recently, however, courts
have recognized that the very act of taking a person out in one's
boat constitutes participation in the creation of the danger of
drowning.38 The resulting duty to rescue is imposed only on the
owner or operator of the boat because of this participation and be-
cause of the passenger's necessary dependence on him.3 9 The duty
does not extend to other parties who might be in a position to res-
cue a person from a danger that arose independently of them: to
impose such a duty would be to cross the line from misfeasance to
nonfeasance.
The analysis of nonfeasance in terms of risk creation also ex-
plains why, even though a risk may have arisen independently of a
defendant, he is responsible for aggravation of the danger, that is,
for substantially increasing the likelihood that it will materialize in
harm. By diminishing the ability of the victim or of others to abate
the danger, the defendant, though innocent of the original danger,
must account for the increased risk. Indeed, the defendant's action
can occur before the original risk even begins to materialize, as
when an insurance agent neglects to arrange for the negotiated
35. E.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 20001 (West 1971); Criminal Code, CAN. REV. STAT. ch.
C-34, s. 232 (1970); Highway Traffic Act, ONTr. REv. STAT. ch. 202, s. 140 (1970).
36. E.g., Jordan House Ltd. v. Menow & Honsberger, 38 D.L.R.3d 105 (Can. 1973);
cf. Tubbs v. Argus, 140 Ind. App. 695, 225 N.E.2d 841 (1967) (invitee in automobile).
To the extent that tort law's function is to shape the behavior of the defendant, the sta-
tus of the plaintiff in such circumstances should not be crucial: in many cases, that status is
unknown to the defendant at the moment when action is required. Some courts have rec-
ognized the primary importance of the defendant's control over the instrumentality
causing injury. E.g., L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E.2d 334 (1942); Tubbs
v. Argus, 140 Ind. App. 695, 225 N.E.2d 841 (1967). Moreover, several recent cases have
held that liability for failure to abate a danger may be imposed on an occupier of property
even when the persons injured are licensees or trespassers. E.g., Smith v. Arbaugh's Res-
taurant, 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Pridgen v. Boston Hous. Auth., 364 Mass. 696, 308
N.E.2d 467 (1974).
37. Vanvalkenburg v. Northern Navigation Co., 19 D.L.R. 649 (Ont. S. Ct. 1913).
38. Most courts now hold that a captain must make reasonable attempts to rescue crew
members. E.g., Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 F.2d 866, 868 (4th Cir. 1931).
39. See Hutchinson v. Dickie, 162 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 830
(1947) (yacht captain has duty to use reasonable care to rescue social guest on yacht for
pleasure cruise); Horsley v. MacLaren, 22 D.L.R.3d 545, 546 (Can. 1971) (same).
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coverage. 40 Although the inducing of reliance is the most usual ex-
ample of aggravating an independent risk,41 it does not exhaust
the category. Cutting off the victim from the aid that third parties
might naturally be inclined to give is as much misfeasance as lulling
the victim into a false sense of security and decreasing his ability to
remove himself from peril. Although it may be nonfeasance to re-
fuse to rescue a drowning person whose predicament arose inde-
pendently, it is misfeasance to hide the rope that others might toss
out to him.
42
II. Arguments Against a Duty to Rescue
Both courts and commentators generally consider it morally out-
rageous that the defense of nonfeasance can deny endangered per-
sons a legal right to easy rescue.43 Yet the defense is taken to be so
basic to the law and so compelling that it overrides the moral per-
ceptions of the judges and the shared attitudes of the community.
This in itself is a tribute to the power of the idea of nonfeasance.
Few legal concepts, however, are applied in an absolute or mono-
lithic manner. The purpose of this section is to explore the justifi-
cations that can be offered in support of the common-law position,
and thus to discover the limits of the nonfeasance idea.
The most explicit and elaborate justification of the absence of a
duty to rescue-almost the only such attempt in the legal
literature 44-- appears in an important and ambitious article by Pro-
40. Fine's Flowers Ltd. v. General Accident Assur. Co. of Can., 81 D.L.R.3d 139 (Ont.
C.A. 1977) (insurance agent liable for failure to obtain requested full coverage for
plaintiff's greenhouses); Baxter v. Jones, 6 Ont. L.R. 360 (C.A. 1903) (general insurance
agent liable for failure to notify plaintiff's other insurers of additional insurance). Baxter
can be seen either as a case of misplaced reliance or, because the placing of the subsequent
insurance without notice to the other insurers deprived the insured of coverage he previ-
ously had, as a case in which the agent participated in the creation of a risk.
41. This type of misfeasance is therefore usually viewed as in the legal borderland be-
tween tort and contract. See Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64
HARV. L. REv. 913, 914 (1951); Wright, Negligent "Acts or Omissions," 19 CAN. B. REV. 465,
471 n.14 (1941).
42. See Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., 158 Misc. 904, 287 N.Y.S. 134 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (depart-
ment store assumed duty towards ailing customer when it moved her to isolated infirmary,
where other aid could not reach her).
43. See note 17 supra; note 48 infra.
44. For another recent defense of the common-law rule, see Note, supra note 1. In R.
POSNER, supra note 13, Richard Posner suggests that a duty to rescue might be inefficient,
but in Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans and Other Rescuers: An Economic
Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 126 (1978), the conclusion is much more
qualified. D'Amato, The "Bad Samaritan" Paradigm, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 798, 802 (1975), ac-
cepts Epstein's argument that there should be no tort liability for failure to rescue, but pro-
poses that there should be criminal liability. Epstein himself has reiterated his position on
rescue. See Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477, 491-93 (1979).
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fessor Richard Epstein.45 Epstein's work challenges the conception
of tort law as a body of law embodying utilitarian and economic as-
sumptions and seeks to develop "a normative theory of torts that
takes into account common sense notions of individual responsibil-
ity."'46 In his view, the idea that one is responsible for whatever
harm one causes is the fundamental moral principle in the law of
torts: unless one of a few specified excuses can be invoked, liability
should follow from a finding of causation of harm. Thus strict lia-
bility should replace negligence as the dominant notion in tort law.
More importantly for the rescue situation, absence of causation
renders one immune from liability; in particular, there should be
no duty to abate a danger one did not cause.
Epstein's conception of responsibility purports to reflect com-
mon morality in its attention both to the effects on other persons of
an individual's conduct and to the motive with which actions are
performed.
[M]ost systems of conventional morality try to distinguish be-
tween those circumstances in which a person should be
compelled to act for the benefit of his fellow man, and those
cases where he should be allowed to do so only if prompted by
the appropriate motives. To put the point in other terms, the
distinction is taken between that conduct which is required and
that which, so to speak is beyond the call of duty. If that dis-
tinction is accepted as part of a common morality, then the ar-
gument in favor of the good Samaritan rule is that it, better
than any possible alternatives, serves to mark off the first class
of activities from the second. Compensation for harm caused
can be demanded in accordance with the principles of strict li-
ability. Failure to aid those in need can invoke at most moral
censure on the ground that the person so accused did not vol-
untarily conform his conduct to some "universal" principle of
justice. The rules of causation, which create liability in the first
case, deny it in the second. It may well be that the conduct of
individuals who do not aid fellow men is under some circum-
stances outrageous, but it does not follow that a legal system
that does not enforce a duty to aid is outrageous as well.
47
This passage is problematic in a number of ways. First, the con-
clusion that there is no obligation to rescue under any circum-
stances seems to conflict with Epstein's general purpose to develop
45. Epstein Theory, supra note 14, at 189-204.
46. Id. at 151.
47. Id. at 200-0 1.
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a normative theory corresponding to common-sense morality. Crit-
icism of the common-law position on rescue, after all, rests on the
perception that, as a matter of inarticulate common sense, it is
wrong for one person to stand by as another suffers an injury that
could easily be prevented. 48 Moreover, Epstein concedes that the
behavior of such defendants is "under some circumstances outra-
geous." There is a paradox in concluding, as Epstein does, that the
legal doctrine in question, reprobated though it is, is actually in ac-
cord with common-sense notions of morality.
Second, as a defense of the common-law position on rescue,
Epstein's single-minded concern with causation may prove too
much. Although there is no general requirement of rescue at com-
mon law, rescue is required if any of several special relationships
exists between the parties. 49 Epstein's defense of the common-law
position on rescue poses the dilemma of abandoning that part of
the position requiring rescue in special circumstances or acknowl-
edging that tort liability is not based solely on causation.
These criticisms of Epstein's argument point to a lack of coher-
ence among the argument's premises, actual conclusions, and pur-
ported conclusion. The argument, however, is also somewhat ob-
scure. Epstein's argument that the absence of a duty to rescue at
common law is consistent with moral principles is open to any of
several interpretations. It might be a denial that there is a moral
obligation to rescue, even though failure to rescue arouses "moral
censure" and outrage, because rescue falls in the class of conduct
that is "beyond the call of duty." Alternatively, the argument might
be conceding that there is a moral obligation to rescue but denying
that the creation of a parallel legal duty is justified. Moreover, this
second interpretation might suppose either that, as a matter of
principle, a chasm exists between the ethical and the legal realms,
or that the transformation of this particular ethical duty into a legal
one is inappropriate. An assessment of Epstein's argument must
begin by examining the far-reaching issues raised by these various
interpretations.
Epstein seeks to justify the absence of a common-law duty to res-
cue by invoking the distinction in common morality between acts
48. Even judges who have dismissed claims by victims against callous non-rescuers have
indicated the moral revulsion with which they regard the defendant's inaction. E.g., Union
Pacific Ry. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649, 653, 72 P. 281, 282 (1903); Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co.,
69 N.H. 257, 260, 44 A. 809, 810 (1898); Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 332, 155 A.2d 343,
346 (1959).
49. See note 1 supra.
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that are required and acts that are beyond the call of duty.50 This
distinction has been the subject of much attention in moral and le-
gal philosophy-for example, in Lon Fuller's development of a
contrast between the morality of duty and the morality of aspira-
tion.51 Acts that are beyond the call of duty demand of the agent
extraordinary heroism or sacrifice, and "while we praise their per-
formance, we do not condemn their non-performance. '52 The very
fact that a failure to rescue may evoke moral censure, as Epstein
concedes, is a strong indication that the rescue was obligatory and
not supererogatory. The distinction that Epstein endorses there-
fore should not lead him to a simple denial of any duty to rescue;
rather it should lead to efforts to structure the duty to avoid
requiring of the rescuer the heroism or sacrifice that characterizes
the morality of aspiration. In fact, all the proposals of the last two
centuries for a legal duty to rescue have been structured in this
way.53
Epstein thus cannot sustain the position that failure to effect an
easy rescue is not immoral.5 4 His remarks can alternatively be in-
terpreted as conceding that rescue is a moral requirement but
denying that it should be a legal one. That he probably intends this
view is indicated by his comment that although failure to aid a per-
50. The Epstein paragraph quoted above says many things in a small compass, and in-
terpretation is difficult. Epstein seems to regard cases in which conduct is beyond the call
of duty as equivalent to cases in which a person should be "allowed" to benefit his fellow
man only if prompted by the appropriate motives. I have no idea what Epstein means by
this. The issue is whether rescue is obligatory, not whether it is permitted. John Stuart Mill
mentioned the problem of whether it is right to rescue a person if one's motive is to pre-
serve him for torture, J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 26 n.* (1888), which may be the problem
that Epstein had in mind, but such a tiny problem cannot be relevant to the issue of a gen-
eral duty to rescue.
51. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 3, 30-32 (1964). In recent moral philosophy, the
seminal essay is Urmson, Saints and Heroes, in ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 198-216 (A.
Melden ed. 1958); cf. R. FLATHMAN, POLITICAL OBLIGATION 34-38 (1972) (distinguishing
obligation from aspiration towards ideal).
52. H. SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 219 (7th ed. 1907); see R. FLATHMAN, supra
note 51, at 155-56. Flathman points out that to think that obligation implies praise be-
speaks either misapprehension or an unsettled moral environment. But there may be ex-
ceptional circumstances where praise is in order. If the jewelry in Guy de Maupassant's
story, La Parure, had been real, would not the enormous sacrifices undergone by the bor-
rowers have been praiseworthy, even though they were endured solely for the purpose of
repaying a debt? Similarly, would not the soldier be praiseworthy who undertakes an ex-
ceptionally dangerous, though obligatory, mission in wartime?
53. The various proposals in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, supra note 1, are so
structured.
54. The discussion to this point does not, of course, show that rescue is morally re-
quired. It has been concerned only with critically exploring the implications of Epstein's
defense of the common-law position. Section IV of this article considers rescue as a moral
requirement.
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son may be outrageous, "it does not follow that a legal system that
does not enforce a duty to aid is outrageous as well."5 5 This at-
tempt to separate morality and legality may in turn reflect any of
the following three notions: that transforming this particular moral
duty into a legal duty is administratively difficult, that legal duties
are generally disjoint from moral ones, or that there is some reason
of principle that disqualifies this particular moral duty from being
a legal duty.
56
The first of these alternatives is frequently invoked. 57 The ad-
herents of this position point to the difficulty of determining who
among the many potential rescuers should be held liable. This
point can also be made in terms of fairness: singling out one from
a group of equally culpable non-rescuers is unfairly to differentiate
among like cases.58 Why these difficulties should be of decisive
weight, however, is hard to see. Even if there are many possible
rescuers, the difficulties are no less surmountable than are those in
cases of negligence involving many tortfeasors. Though potentially
more complicated on average, the rules could be the same: the vic-
tim has a right to only one recovery, and all tortfeasors are liable to
the victim, but they are entitled to contribution among themselves.
The device of contribution, moreover, might be invoked by the de-
fendant to prevent his being unfairly singled out: because the pur-
pose of contribution is to prevent the unjust enrichment that would
otherwise accrue when one party is forced by law to discharge an
obligation to which others are also subject,5 9 a defendant would be
able to claim contribution from other potential rescuers.
The second interpretation of Epstein's argument, that moral and
legal duties are in principle separate, is the most comprehensive of
the three. Under this approach, the immorality of not rescuing has
55. See p. 259 supra.
56. The first and third propositions address the specific character of the rescue duty;
the second addresses, in general, the relationship of law and morality. See pp. 260-61 supra.
57. E.g., Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., [1970] A.C. 1004, 1027 (H.L.) (Lord Reid)
("And when a person has done nothing to put himself in any relationship with another
person in distress or with his property mere accidental propinquity does not require him to
go to that person's assistance. There may be a moral duty to do so, but it is not practicable
to make it a legal duty."); see Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435 n.5,
551 P.2d 334, 343 n.5, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 n.5 (1976) (common law rule is "[m]orally
questionable" but "owes its survival to 'the difficulties of setting any workable standards of
unselfish service to fellow men, and of making any workable rule to cover possible situa-
tions where fifty people might fail to rescue . . .' (Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 56, p.
341).")
58. See Fried, Right and Wrong-Preliminary Considerations, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 181-82
(1976).
59. See Weinrib, Contribution in a Contractual Setting, 54 CAN. B. REv. 338, 342 (1976).
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no bearing on whether the omission should be legally con-
demned.60 Although this proposition seems to raise basic and long-
standing jurisprudential questions, it does not raise the ancient
dispute between natural-law theory and positive-law theory. An ad-
herent of natural-law theory can more readily pass between the
moral and the legal domains, but the positivist too, though perhaps
more skeptical about the feasibility of discovering moral duties, can
approve the creation of a legal duty to parallel a moral one. For the
legal positivist, law may have any content, moral or immoral, 61 and
particular moral duties can be made into legal ones.
62
More affirmatively, the role of the common-law judge centrally
involves making moral duties into legal ones. The disqualification
of moral considerations from the judge's decision would leave him
with very sparse resources. Formalist reasoning from preexisting
rules is indeterminate in many cases. 63 Moreover, if the system is
consistent, no rules, including the premises for such formalist rea-
soning, could have moral dimensions. The first case in any new
60. Cf. Union Pacific Ry. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649, 653, 72 P. 281, 282 (1903) ("With
the humane side of the question courts are not concerned. It is the omission or negligent
discharge of legal duties only which come within the sphere of judicial cognizance.") A
more extreme version of this position is implied in Schacht v. The Queen, 30 D.L.R.3d
641, 651 (Ont. C.A. 1972) ("Much as the humanitarian spirit which motivated the conduct
of the good Samaritan has been lauded, it was rooted in moral philosophy, hence from the
legal standpoint the laissez-faire attitude of the priest and the Levite was condoned.") For
this view, the existence of a moral duty to rescue is not only irrelevant to the judgment but
precludes the construction of a parallel legal duty.
61. Thus, it is not surprising that the sort of content that Dworkin finds in the common
law is consistent with the formal analysis of the positivists. See Weinreb, Law As Order, 91
HARV. L. REV. 909 (1978).
62. The writings of John Austin illustrate how legal positivism can be combined with le-
gal reform. Austin, who said that "the existence of law is one thing, its merit or demerit is
another," J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 184 (H. Hart ed. 1954),
derived several consequences from this statement: an immoral law may be valid; when con-
science counsels disobedience to law, it is only out of ignorance or self-interest; and because
moral judgments are always in dispute, judicial attention to morality as a basis for decision
may result in arbitrariness. Austin, however, did not assert that the existence of a moral
obligation is irrelevant to the construction of a parallel legal obligation. On the contrary,
his distinction between the law as it is and as it ought to be was borrowed from Bentham,
J. BENTHAM, A Fragment on Government, in A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A
FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 393, 397 (J. Burns & H. Hart eds. 1977), who used it as a tool
for criticizing Blackstone's complacent description of the common law and for proposing
reform of the law on utilitarian principles. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 597 (1958). Even Austin believed that there is no general
reason for not translating a rationally justifiable moral view into a legal obligation.
A utilitarian positivist like Austin would hold, at most, that particular morai duties
should not be enforced as legal duties if the process of enforcement would be too costly.
The classical utilitarians, however, did not consider this objection fatal to a duty to effect
an easy rescue. See pp. 279-86 infra.
63. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 14-24 (1921).
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line of development could not be justified on legal grounds alone;
yet it would be decisive for all posterity. Indeed, it is difficult to im-
agine how a judge in a case of first impression would proceed.
Conversely, moral duties not only provide a basis for judicial justi-
fication; they also provide a minimal standard for legal legitimacy.
If any legal obligations are legitimate, legal obligations that dupli-
cate preexisting moral ones must be. The only grounds for
opposing the imposition of such a legal duty would be the general
one that law should not coerce.
64
The third interpretation of Epstein's position postulates a dis-
junction in principle not between moral and legal duties generally,
but between the particular moral duty to effect an easy rescue and
its proposed legal analogue. Such a position combines an admission
that rescue is morally required, a recognition that legal duties may
justifiably be created to parallel moral ones, and a principled argu-
ment that the moral duty to'rescue is beyond the justifiable scope
of state action. This position has a long history in both the utilitar-
ian and non-utilitarian traditions, though Epstein, who does not
explicitly take this position, makes no mention of its historic roots.
Because the early statements form parts of comprehensive legal
philosophies, and are not merely, as in Epstein's case, possible in-
terpretations of murkily expressed reflections on the common law
of torts, it is worth examining the eighteenth-century expositions
and their relations to Epstein's position.
The principal utilitarian adherent to this position was the proto-
anarchist William Godwin. Godwin's comprehensive view of moral-
ity required everyone to devote all of their resources, energies, and
opportunities to the assistance of others in order to maximize the
utility of all.65 His position on rescue was that there was a moral
duty to rescue even when it required extreme personal sacrifice.66
This extreme view of individuals' moral duty, however, was
64. This notion of legal obligation is embodied in the concept of malurm in se, which was
seized upon by critics of Hobbes centuries ago to specify the minimum content of political
obligation, and thus to reject pure political contractarianism. See S. CLARKE, A DISCOURSE
OF NATURAL RELIGION 228 (1706), reprinted in 1 D. RAPHAEL, BRITISH MORALISTS
1650-1800, at 191, 196 (1969); R. CUDWORTH, A TREATISE CONCERNING ETERNAL AND
IMMUTABLE MORALITY 122 (1731), reprinted in 1 D. RAPHAEL, supra, at 105; cf. I W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *54-55 (positive law has no force with regard to naturally
wrong actions). The concept cannot embody a complete theory of political obligation be-
cause it ignores mala prohibita and the political element of obligations; but it does provide a
minimum content.
65. See 1 W. GODWIN, ENQUIRY CONCERNING POLITICAL JUSTICE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON
GENERAL VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS 165, 192, 219, 327 (I. Kramnick ed. 1976).
66. Id. at 169.
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matched by an equally narrow view of the role of law. In Godwin's
ideal society, individuals would do their duties without any compul-
sion from the law, which would respect each person's right to pri-
vate judgment, a right that was essential for the development of
the person's moral capacities. Even in contemporary society, which
was not ripe for the dissolution of government, this right to private
judgment determined the scope of law. In this society, the govern-
ment's function was to ensure that the exercise of each individual's
private judgment did not intrude upon his neighbor's equal right
to private judgment. The government could legitimately prevent
one person from harming another, because harm impaired the ex-
ercise of private judgment; but it could not legitimately force one
person to benefit another, even though such benefaction might be
morally required, because such coercion would violate the right to
private judgment.
Godwin would evidently have agreed with Epstein that the moral
outrageousness of a failure to act should not entail a legal duty to
act. Yet Godwin's argument is not very secure. Particularly ques-
tionable is the place of the right to private judgment in Godwin's
utilitarian framework. Rights are always problematic for utilitari-
ans, 68 and Godwin's right to private judgment is no exception.
Godwin does not mean that this right is immune to the utilitarian
calculus, but rather, that regard for it in the calculus will lead to
the utilitarian goal of general happiness, and that it can therefore
be suspended whenever utility requires.6 9 The right is accordingly
vulnerable to differing assessments of utility. Thus evaluated,
Godwin's view that man's moral development requires the law's ab-
stention from interference in private judgment is implausible. Both
Plato and Aristotle disputed it;7 0 and although the idea that legal
action can effectively and legitimately promote virtue has not been
as popular in the last two hundred years as it had been in the pre-
vious two thousand, it still has considerable force.7 1 Moreover, in
the context of rescue, the immense gain in utility through the sav-
ing of life may plausibly be thought to outweigh the disadvantage
67. Id. at 198, 234.
68. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90, 171 (1977).
69. Set W. GODWIN, supra note 65, at 225.
70. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1179b (W. Ross trans. 1954); PLATO, GORGIAS
517 (W. Woodhead trans. 1953).
71. See, e.g., W. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY (1976); W. BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE, AND THE FIRST AIENDMENT (1957); Salkever,
Virtue, Obligation and Politics, 68 Am. PoL SCi. REv. 78 (1974).
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of a small moral retardation inherent in legal compulsion;
Bentham and Mill, at least, thought so. 72
The most important non-utilitarian adherent to the view that the
moral duty to aid another did not justify the creation of a parallel
legal duty was Immanuel Kant. Morality, for Kant, was the internal
phenomenon of a person freely fulfilling a duty that, using pure
practical reason, he legislates for himself; and practical reason re-
quires the duty to give assistance to others. Law, by contrast, co-
erces individuals by regulating external action. Although law and
ethics may coincidentally legislate about the same conduct, law can-
not make a person virtuous: virtue is by its nature indifferent to
external compulsion.7 3 Yet positive law can be just. To do so, it
must reflect some formal and universal principle, and because pos-
itive law acts only upon the external freedom of the person, not on
his internal freedom as a morally autonomous agent, justice, for
Kant, was "the aggregate of those conditions under which the will
of one person can be cojoined with the will of another in accor-
dance with a universal law of freedom.
' 74
For Kant, as for Godwin, freedom was central. But Kant reached
a position similar to Godwin's without the utilitarian grounding
that made Godwin's position vulnerable to differing predictive as-
sessments. Acts of misfeasance may properly be prohibited by posi-
tive law because they cannot coexist with the freedom of everyone
as defined by a universal law; but beneficence, of which rescue is a
part, was beyond the scope of justice. Either acts of beneficence
were responses to specific needs and desires, or else they followed
from a general policy of benevolence that had been adopted by the
benefactor. If the former, Kant thought, they were not a manifes-
tation of morality because specific desires and needs cannot be the
subjects of a universal law.7 - If the latter, they were a manifestation
of morality because the adoption of such a policy was required by
pure practical reason; but a policy of benevolence was an internal
matter beyond the reach of the external constraints of positive law.
An objection to the artificiality of this distinction between misfea-
72. See J. BENTHAM, s.upra note 12, at 292-93; J. S. MILL, On Liberty, in ESSENTIAL
WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 255-56 (M. Lerner ed. 1961). The utilitarian position is ex-
plored in more detail below. See pp. 279-92 infra.
73. I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 19 (J. Ladd trans. 1965). Epstein
apparently refers to this tradition of ethics when he says that the compulsion of positive
law is destructive of the moral worth of the act. See Epstein Theory, supra note 14, at 200.
Kant's point is different; it is that legal compulsion is irrelevant to the moral worth of
the act.
74. I. KANT, supra note 73, at 34.
75. Id.
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sance and nonfeasance would point out that the liberty of an en-
dangered person is equally limited by misfeasance and nonfea-
sance. For Kant, however, beneficence was special because it is the
subject of an imperfect duty-that is, a duty that varies according
to specific circumstances, so that "the law cannot specify precisely
what and how much one's actions should do toward the obligatory
end. '76 Kant viewed the moral duty to effect an easy rescue in an
emergency and the moral duty to help the needy as indistinguisha-
ble; both are merely instances of an ethically required policy of be-
neficence not susceptible to a legal duty. Because no particular ac-
tion can be required in many circumstances-although there may
be a duty to give charity, no particular person is required to give
any particular amount to any particular charitable cause-the omis-
sion of any particular action cannot be considered a legal wrong.
At first glance, Kant's analysis does not seem to apply to the legal
obligation to rescue that is usually put forward. A duty to effect an
easy rescue in an emergency seems to have the specificity that
Kant's imperfect duty of beneficence lacks. In fact, Kant's rejection
of a legal duty can apply only if the apparent difference between
the rescue proposal and the duty of beneficence can be proven
illusory. Here Epstein provides the argument suggested by the
Kantian analysis.
In his defense of the common-law position, Epstein argues that
confining the duty to rescue to situations of emergency and lack of
inconvenience would not be feasible. For Epstein, as for Kant and
Godwin, freedom is a central value; indeed, he believes that "the
first task of the law of torts is to define the boundaries of individ-
ual liberty. ' 77 If the proposed duty is admitted, he argues, no prin-
cipled basis could be found to prevent unacceptable infringements
of individual liberty. Charitable contributions in amounts depen-
dent on the donor's wealth would become compulsory if it were
substantially certain that without them someone would die. More-
over, because the inconvenience to the reluctant rescuer could be
eliminated by the victim's offer of objectively suitable reimburse-
ment, the rescuer would find himself coerced to exchange the
means of salvation for compensation. Once such forced exchanges
are required, says Epstein, there will be no way to distinguish lib-
erty from obligation or contract from tort. 8
76. I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE 49 (M. Gregor trans. 1964).
77. Epstein Theory, supra note 14, at 203.
78. Id. at 199.
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This argument is the most powerful objection that can be made
to the judicial creation and enforcement of a duty to effect an easy
rescue. The argument does not merely assert the priority of lib-
erty: the rescue proposal's emergency and convenience limitations,
which are absent in misfeasance situations, reflect that priority.
Rather, Epstein's argument is that no principles that respect the
priority of liberty can distinguish between rescue and beneficence.
The next two sections of this article explore and respond to this ar-
gument.
III. Common-Law Foundations for a Duty of Easy Rescue
To the extent that an issue of interpersonal action is not made
the subject of a tort or criminal duty, it is remitted to the operation
of the law of contract. If neither tort law nor criminal law imposes
a duty to rescue, the relations between rescuer and victim are left
entirely to the contractual arrangements between them. Absent any
duty, a victim cannot conscript a rescuer's services; he must pur-
chase them under the usual contractual mechanisms.
7 9
Contract law gives practical application to a market society's reli-
ance on consensual private ordering, and thus provides the princi-
pal embodiment in the law of the ideal of individual liberty. 0 It
both gives individuals the means to exercise their liberty and re-
stricts liberty where, for either practical or ideological reasons, the
circumstances are not appropriate for its exercise. In particular,
the law of contract presupposes a certain social equality of those
who engage in the bargaining process.8 ' In thus giving shape to the
ideal of liberty in its application to specific circumstances, contract
law can be looked to for evidence of the extent to which, and the
situations in which, the law prizes individual liberty.
To the extent that contract law reveals principles that distinguish
a duty to rescue from a more thoroughgoing duty of beneficence,
it provides a response to Professor Epstein's challenge to find a
principled basis for imposing a duty to rescue that respects the
law's ideal of liberty. The object of this section of the article is to
demonstrate that such principles exist. More generally, this section
shows that there is a pattern in the common law that the creation
of a duty of easy rescue would extend in a coherent manner.
79. See Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination and Non-Feasance, 46 CoLuf. L. REV. 196,
214 (1946).
80. See Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 128 (S. Hampshire
ed. 1978).
81. See C. FRIED, supra note 14, at 100.
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The common-law position on nonfeasance generally relies on
contract law, and hence on the market, to regulate the provision of
aid to others for independently existing dangers. 82 There are ex-
ceptions, however, that require a person to abate a risk to another
even though he had no part in creating the risk. These exceptions
exemplify the relationship between the existence of a tort obliga-
tion and the absence of any social value in the liberty to contract.
A recent case illustrates the relationship. In O'Rourke v. Schacht,8 3
a police officer was held liable in tort for failing to warn automo-
bile drivers of a dangerous highway condition that he had not cre-
ated. 4 In the course of his duties, he had come across a section of
road where a sign warning of highway excavation had been
knocked down. The court's holding required the policeman to con-
fer a benefit on other drivers without permitting him to bargain
for compensation. Because society's interest in upholding freedom
to contract, if present at all, is very attenuated, however, this coer-
cion and the concomitant deprivation of the opportunity to con-
tract are not serious. The transaction costs of negotiating with suc-
cessive drivers are so high, and the form of negotiation is so
unmanageable, that contracting would be highly inefficient if not
completely unfeasible8 5 More importantly, a policeman's contract
to sell information about road conditions would be undesirable and
perhaps unenforceable. 86 The police officer is already under a
public duty, reinforced by statute, to promote highway safety; his
liberty not to further this goal is not prized by the legal system. 7
82. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 92, at 613-16.
83. 1 Can. S. Ct. 53 (1976).
84. In Newton v. Ellis, 119 Eng. Rep. 424 (K.B. 1855), and Oke v. Weide Transport
Ltd. & Carra, 41 D.L.R.2d 53 (Man. C.A. 1963), the defendants had created the danger on
the highway.
85. Economists are fond of this justification for having an issue dealt with by tort
rather than by contract. E.g., Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inal-
inabihty: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1106 (1972); Posner, Strict Lia-
ity: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 219 (1973).
86. Cf. Gray v. Martino, 19 N.J.L. 462, 103 A. 24 (1918) (police officer may not receive
reward for recovery of stolen property); English Law Revision Committee, The Statute of
Frauds and the Doctrine of Consideration, 15 CAN. B. REV. 585, 605 (1937) (reprinting LAW
REVISION COMMITTEE, SIXTH INTERIM REPORT, CMD. 5449).
In England v. Davidson, 113 Eng. Rep. 640 (Q.B. 1840), the court held enforceable a
promise to give a reward for information regarding the commission of a crime, even
though the claimant of the reward was a police constable. Two circumstances should be
noted. First, the court considered the policeman not bound by duty to reveal the informa-
tion, thus implying that if he had been so bound, the contract would not have been en-
forceable. Second, the offer was made to the whole world, not specifically to police consta-
bles; thus, it does not follow from the case that the constable would have been able to
initiate or to engage in negotiations for the divulging of particular information.
87. These remarks on liberty deal only with the market position of a police officer
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The court in O'Rourke laid particular stress on the police officer's
statutory obligation to maintain a traffic patrol, and it is especially
important to clarify the role of the statute.8 8 As read in the light of
the legislative intent, the statute did not create a civil cause of ac-
tion, but it did supply authoritative evidence of a public policy sig-
naling the weakness of contract values in this context, and it is
therefore relevant to the judicial decision. s9 The framework of in-
dividual liberty embodied in the law of contract, and reflected in
the statute, is thus seen not to be violated by the imposition of a
duty in tort.
The pattern of a tort obligation existing when the values of con-
tractual liberty are absent is also illustrated by the duty that family
members owe to each other.90 Despite its intuitive clarity, this duty
when contract values are manifest. Of course, there is also an administrative justification
for not forcing the officer to act: he should be free to allocate his scarce resources of time
and attention to the problems that seem most urgent to him or to his superiors. But this
consideration concerns only the adequacy of particular conduct as an attempt to fulfill the
duty to act; it does not concern the existence of the duty. The problem it raises is not the
interaction of tort law with contract, but the interaction of tort law with the discretion of
administrative agents. Here the courts have evinced a reasonably limited respect for the ex-
ercise of bona fide discretion by public authorities. See, e.g., American Exch. Bank v.
United States, 257 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1958) (Federal Tort Claims Act not violated by dis-
cretionary decision not to install handrails on public staircase); City of Freeport v. Isbell, 83
Ill. 440 (1877) (misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction applied to find no liability for city inac-
tion); Anns v. London Borough of Merton, [1978] A.C. 728, 754 (H.L.) (Lord Wilberforce)
(public agency not liable if act or omission within statutorily defined discretion); Home
Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., [1970] A.C. 1004, 1068 (H.L.) (Lord Diplock) (same). In
O'Rourke v. Schacht, I Can. S. Ct. 53 (1976), aff'g Schacht v. The Queen, 30 D.L.R.3d 641
(Ont. C.A. 1972), there was apparently no police business of competing urgency. See 30
D.L.R.3d at 644.
88. A dissenting opinion reasoned that if the police officer were liable, the liability must
flow either from the legislation or from the common law. The statute was excluded be-
cause there was no indication that the legislature intended to create civil liability. The com-
mon law was excluded because the danger in question existed independently of the de-
fendant, whose behavior was therefore an instance of pure nonfeasance. Because liability
could be based on neither statute nor common law, there could be no liability. O'Rourke v.
Schacht, 1 Can. S. Ct. 53, 74-87 (1976) (Martland, J., dissenting). This argument, contrary
to the familiar common-law practice, see note 89 infra, views statutes and the common law
as watertight compartments.
89. The use of statutes as sources of public policy is common practice in common-law
adjudication. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of the Law, in HARVARD LEGAL Ess*ys 213
(1934), reprinted in 2 HARV. J. LEGIs. 7 (1965); Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law
Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 401 (1968); cf. Jordan House Ltd. v. Menow, 38 D.L.R.3d 105,
110 (Can. 1973) (statute described as "crystallizing a relevant fact situation which, because
of its authoritative source, the Court was entitled to consider in determining, on common
law principles, whether a duty of care should be raised"). The legislative-intent approach
has often been criticized. E.g., C. WRIGHT, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 284 (4th ed.
1967); Alexander, Legislation and the Standard of Care in Negligence, 42 CAN. B. REv. 243
(1964); Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 21
(1949).
90. See People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128 (1907); Territory v.
Manton, 8 Mont. 95, 19 P. 387 (1888); R. v. Russell, [1933] Vict. 59.
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has proved difficult to analyze. Bohlen, for instance, could do no
better than to classify it among a miscellany of situations, and to as-
sert that it derived broadly from "the ability of the one upon whom
the duty is alleged to rest to afford the necessary protection and
the dependence and helplessness of him who claims that the duty is
owing to him."91 This justification for a duty to rescue goes far be-
yond anything the common law or its critics supported. The
contract-values analysis provides a much better justification for the
family category. The common law has traditionally held that, ab-
sent express evidence of intention to the contrary, family agree-
ments are "outside the realm of contracts" and that "each house is
a domain into which the King's writ does not seek to run. 92 More-
over, statutory requirements that certain family members supply
certain necessities of life to those within their charge are com-
mon. 93 The law thus deems some family relations never appropri-
ate for market regulation, and others regulable only when natural
affection is clearly inadequate to support or account for the rela-
dons.9 4
The conceptual pattern revealed by special-relationship excep-
tions casts light on the reach of the main rule. The thread that runs
through the apparently diverse cases of police officer and family
member is the law's refusal to recognize persons in these roles as
market agents and its consequent tolerance for the deprivation of
liberty involved in coercing them to act. When an endangered
stranger can be rescued with ease, elements of the same pattern are
present. If a potential rescuer struck a bargain with a drowning
person before tossing him a rope, the agreement reached would be
unenforceable as unconscionable or made under duress. Thus, in
Post v. Jones,95 the United States Supreme Court held unforce-
able a contract imposed by rescuers on whalers who had been ma-
rooned in the Arctic. Noting the passivity and helplessness of the
defendant and the absence of market conditions for competition,
the Court declared the agreement "a transaction which has no
91. Bohlen, supra note 18, at 227.
92. Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571, 579 (C.A.).
93. For example, in Sommers v. Putnam Bd. of Educ., 113 Ohio St. 177, 148 N.E. 682
(1925), a statute requiring a man to see that his children attend school formed one ground
for holding the school board liable for the costs that the man incurred in transporting his
children to school when the school board failed to perform its statutory duty to provide
transportation.
94. In placing value and reliance on natural affection, the law exhibits its commitment
to the ethical priority of certain human ties. The argument given below for a duty of easy
rescue that rests on Kantian principles, see pp. 287-92 infra, relies on this commitment.
95. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 150 (1857).
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characteristic of a valid contract."96 In this sort of emergency, there
are no liberty-of-contract values to be vindicated by the absence of
a tort duty. It therefore seems that the imposition of a duty to ef-
fect an easy rescue in an emergency would form a coherent part
of a growing pattern 97 in those doctrines that most fully embody
the common law's notion of individual liberty.
The relationship between tort obligation and contract values also
provides a way of circumscribing the duty to rescue and thus of an-
swering the formidable objections to recognizing such a duty. The
responses depend in part on the fact that the duty is to be created
and enforced by the judiciary, not by another branch of govern-
ment. One of Professor Epstein's objections, it will be recalled,
98
was that the imposition of a duty of easy rescue would be impossi-
ble to confine within acceptable limits: the wealthy, for example,
would be compelled to make charitable contributions to alleviate
hardships in emergencies. 99 This result would be unacceptable in
our legal system because it would make the wealth of the parties a
consideration in the litigation and would thus confound corrective
and distributive justice; it would transform the system of
adjudicating private claims into an administrative agency of the
welfare state. The duty of easy rescue, however, can be distin-
guished from the broader duty of beneficence. In the rescue con-
text, the resource to be expended (time and effort directed at aid-
ing the victim) cannot be traded on the market, and no
administrative scheme could be established to ensure the socially
desirable level of benefits. In the charity context, by contrast, the
resource to be expended (money) can be traded on the market,
and an administrative scheme could be established not only to en-
sure the socially desirable level of benefits but to do so at a lower
social cost than could a judicially enforced duty in tort, or so the
welfare state assumes. In other words, in Epstein's example of
96. Id. at 159; see United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 327-20 (1942)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (fundamental principle of law that courts will not enforce bar-
gains in which one party has unconscionably taken advantage of necessities and distress of
other party).
97. See note 9 supra.
98. See p. 267 supra.
99. A similar point was made by T. MACAULAY, A PENAL CODE PREPARED BY THE IN-
DIAN LAW COMMISSIONERS, note M (1837), reprinted in M. FRIEDLAND, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 265-68 (5th ed. 1978):
On the other hand, it will hardly be maintained that a man should be punished as a
murderer because he omitted to relieve a beggar even though there might be the
clearest proof that the death of the beggar was the effect of this omission, and that the
man who omitted to give the alms knew that the death of the beggar was likely to be
the effect of the omission.
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charitable contributions, but not in the rescue situation, there is a
societal interest in preserving contractual liberty, and an adminis-
trative solution is preferable to a judicial one. There is thus a prin-
cipled reason why a duty of easy rescue need not lead to a general
duty of charity or beneficence.
This seemingly exotic but important point was at stake in London
Borough of Southwark v. Williams.'" The plaintiff borough had left
some houses unoccupied pending redevelopment, and squatters
seeking shelter in London's severe housing shortage occupied
them. In the borough's suit to regain possession, the defendants in-
terposed the defense of necessity; in fact, it does appear that with-
out this housing the squatters' plight would have been appalling.
The issue in the case-whether the private-necessity defense is
good-closely resembles the issue in the rescue situation. In both
situations, a person who had no part in the creation of another's
peril has the power to abate the danger. The issues raised by the
two cases are different only in the means of transferring the re-
sources of salvation. In the rescue context, the law asks whether the
person having the resources is obliged to make them available to
the person in need. In the necessity context, the law asks whether
the person needing the resources may simply appropriate them.
The fundamental question raised by both legal issues is under what
circumstances involuntary transfers are legitimate.
All members of the Southwark court held that, although the law
recognized a defense of necessity, the defense did not apply in this
case. The court divided, however, on the rationale for the result.
Lord Justice Megaw focused on the process aspects of the problem.
Because the court had no criteria to allocate housing, and because
the court could not be certain that all potential claimants were be-
fore it, the borough's policy regarding the distribution of scarce ac-
commodation was for political, not judicial, processes to set. More-
over, judicial approval of the squatter's occupation, he thought,
would both undermine the orderly administrative procedures for
housing distribution and give an unfair preference to the squatters
over others seeking public housing. The necessity defense, what-
ever its scope, must stop short of transforming the courts into an
agency for the general redistribution of wealth. 10 1
Lord Denning and Lord Justice Edmund Davies concentrated on
substantive counterparts to the procedural concerns of Lord Jus-
100. [1971] 2 All E.R. 175 (C.A.).
101. For a discussion of the necessity defense in American law, see W. PROSSER, supra
note I, § 24, at 124-27.
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tice Megaw. "[I]f homelessness were once admitted as a defense to
trespass," Lord Denning feared, "no one's house could be safe;"""2
anarchy and disorder would result. As in Epstein's example of co-
erced charity, the commodity involved could legitimately be traded
for gain on the market, whose orderly processes would be dis-
rupted by recognition of the necessity defense in these circum-
stances. Yet both judges assumed that a plea of necessity would be
upheld in other circumstances. In language reminiscent of sug-
gested formulations of the duty to rescue, Lord Justice Edmund
Davies restricted the operation of the necessity defense to "an ur-
gent situation of imminent peril,"'10 3 a situation one of whose dis-
tinguishing characteristics is the suspension of values associated
with liberty to contract. Because of the close relation between the
necessity and nonfeasance arguments, this restriction can be
transferred to the nonfeasance context, so that even if a duty of
easy rescue were adopted, a claim by homeless persons that a house
owner was obligated to admit them to his property could rationally
be dismissed, even though the claimants needed shelter and the
house was otherwise unoccupied.'
0 4
Using the absence of contract values as a point of reference for
creating a duty to rescue raises several important questions. One is
102. London Borough of Southwark v. Williams, [1971] 2 All E.R. 175, 179 (G.A.)
(Lord Denning, M.R.).
103. Id. at 181; cf. Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1 (1907) (jury question
whether dinner host negligent in refusing request of ill guest to spend the night). Prosser
noted that "the privilege of necessity resembles those of self-defense and defense of prop-
erty," but he also deemed it unwise to confine this privilege "within too narrow limits." W.
PROSSER, supra note 1, § 24, at 127 & n.18.
104. It is sufficient for purposes of this article if the Southwark case shows the attitude
of the common law to involuntary exchanges between individuals of a commodity that has
market value. This theory does not, however, completely justify the holding of the case.
The owner in Southwark was not an individual but a public authority, and the house in
question was not being used at all but had been boarded up by the municipality and then
rendered habitable by the efforts of the squatters. Evicting the squatters and restoring the
property to its unoccupied status might be an example of wasting the resource. It might be
in accord with a liberal theory of law to allow a waste of property by individuals, because it
is illegitimate to interfere with the individual's satisfaction of his self-regarding desires, and
wasting his own resources might provide him with satisfaction. Cf. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF
JUSTIcE 432-33 (1971) (definition of individual satisfaction in moral theory must accommo-
date highly idiosyncratic preferences). But see Brown v. Burdett, 21 Ch. D. 667 (1882) (re-
stricting satisfaction from posthumous waste). By contrast, a public authority must always
act in the public interest and not for the satisfaction of its desires; allowing waste should
therefore be beyond the bounds of its discretion. Thus, Lord Justice Megaw's concern for
the integrity of the queue would be misplaced if there were no queue for this property.
Similarly, Lord Denning's generalization from this case to property in general confounds
the roles of a private individual and a public authority.
I am grateful to my colleague Professor Arnold Weinrib for discussion of these points.
They merit more attention, and we hope to deal with them elsewhere.
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whether such an approach to justifying the adoption of a common-
law rule is circular. To say that the scarce resource in the Southwark
case can be traded on the market, one might object, is to say only
that the law permits such trading; one cannot in turn justify this le-
gal treatment by pointing back to the market. The legal argument
for a duty to rescue in emergencies, however, is not one of deduc-
tion but one of coherence. Recognizing that the central concepts
are those of obligation and liberty, the argument looks for the com-
mon law's concrete manifestation of society's general intuitions
about these concepts. Examining instances of the operation of
these concepts, the argument extracts general features from the in-
stances, searching for and shaping a coherent pattern that fits as
much of the law as possible while respecting the underlying ethical
intuitions.1° 5
A second question raised by the contract-values approach to the
rescue problem is whether the approach helps to define the precise
contours of the duty. How urgent must the emergency be? Even if
the absence of inconvenience to the rescuer is regarded objectively
in terms of market values, is there not a large gray area between
the extremes of tossing a rope and donating to charity? It is these
problems of demarcation, "the difficulties of setting any standards
of unselfish service to fellow men,"' 06 that have traditionally been
seen as insurmountable obstacles to a general requirement of res-
cue; Kant's view of beneficence as an ethical but not a legal duty,
for example, depends on this indeterminacy. However, the issue is
not whether the imposition of a duty to rescue will create an area
of indeterminacy. Because legal language is very often "open tex-
tured," 10 7 the vagueness of a legal principle cannot be a sufficient
ground for repudiating it, especially in a tort system that enshrines
the concept of reasonableness as a fundamental notion. The cor-
rect question is whether the indeterminacy in a rescue principle
will be legally manageable.
The contract-values approach to defining a duty of easy rescue
answers this question by reference to contract law and the neces-
sity defense, where the common-law experience has contradicted
Kant's insistence on precision in legal norms.10 8 The line between
105. Rawls' notion of "reflective equilibrium" is similar. See J. RAWLS, supra note 104, at
20, 48. For the relationship between this notion and legal reasoning, see Dworkin, The
Original Position, 40 U. CHi. L. REV. 500, 511 (1973).
106. V. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 56, at 341.
107. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 120 (1961).
108. Cf. I. KANT, swpra note 73, at 40 (court of equity has self-contradictory nature).
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abuse of unequal bargaining position and the legitimate exercise of
market power is notoriously difficult to draw;10 9 yet few would say
that the rescue agreement imposed upon marooned whalers that
was at issue in Post v. Jones"0 should have been enforceable. Simi-
larly, the possibility of over-extending the necessity defense in
London Borough of Southwark v. Williams"' entails not the repudia-
tion of the defense, but only care in its application. Both duress
and necessity are vague but manageable concepts; a duty of easy
rescue defined to extend the pattern created by the law's use of
these concepts should be equally manageable.'
1 2
A third question raised by the proposed definition of a duty of
easy rescue is what its implications are for a duty properly to con-
tinue an initiated rescue. Consideration of the proper contours of a
duty to continue a rescue has been bedevilled by two facts. First,
courts have tried to narrow the gap between the doctrine that there
is no duty to rescue and their moral discomfort with this doctrine
by using the inchoateness of a rescue attempt as a ground for
requiring its completion without negligence." 3 It is an easy step
from liability for negligently aggravating a pre-existing condition
to liability for carelessly failing in one's endeavor to extend a bene-
fit. 1 4 There is, however, a crucial difference between the two bases
of liability: the former deals with misfeasance, 15 whereas the latter
is grounded on pure nonfeasance. Whatever liberty interest stands
as a bar to a duty to start a rescue remains strong throughout an
initiated rescue as long as the victim has not been made worse
off.116 The only reason a duty to continue a rescue might infringe
109. Some commentators have argued that the law now excessively restricts market
freedom. E.g., Trebilocock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Powers: Post-Benthamite
Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 359 (1976).
110. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 150 (1856).
111. [1971] 2 All E.R. 175 (C.A.).
112. Cf. L. FULLER, supra note 51, at 10 (invisible pointer between morality of duty and
morality of aspiration).
113. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 56, at 343-48; cf. Mathews v. MacLaren, 4 D.L.R.3d
557, 564 (Ont. H.C. 1969) (pleasure-boat master has duty to rescue passenger who has
fallen overboard, even if master not at fault in accident).
114. See, e.g., Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., 158 Misc. 904, 287 N.Y.S. 134 (Sup. Ct. 1935)
(containing language supporting either interpretation).
115. See pp. 251-58 supra. Courts have found liability where a rescuer promises aid,
fails to produce such aid, and the imperiled party or other potential rescuers rely on the
promise. See, e.g., Johnson v. Souza, 71 N.J. Super. 240, 176 A.2d 797 (1961) (host liable to
guest for injury on icy steps because of assurances that steps would be salted). See generally
W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 56, at 343-48.
116. See Wright, supra note 41, at 471. In Alexander, One Rescuer's Obligation to Another:
The 'Ogopogo' Lands in the Supreme Court of Canada, 22 U. TORONTO L.J. 98, 104 (1972), Pro-
fessor E.R. Alexander proposed that there be liability when the defendant has "taken
charge of the situation" on the basis of a "voluntary assumption of duty" comparable to the
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on liberty less than a duty to initiate is the relatively clear opportu-
nity to choose whether to assume the former duty; but this reason
only tempers one criticism and does not justify the duty. In addi-
tion, there is an ethically troubling "incongruity in imposing liabil-
ity on a good Samaritan when he who passes by does not attract
it.' ' "t7 Of course, creating a duty to rescue eliminates these difficul-
ties with a single stroke. It also reduces the uncertainty that arises
when judges use artificial concepts to reach just results that cannot
be reached directly because of deeply embedded rules of law.
The second fact complicating the question of what relevance be-
ginning to act has for a duty to continue is that, at least in the Com-
monwealth, courts have failed to distinguish private rescuers from
public authorities in their definition of the problem. Much atten-
tion, for example, has been paid to East Suffolk Rivers Catchment
Board v. Kent, a1 8 which held the defendant Board not liable for tak-
ing an inordinately long time to drain flooded land; the court rea-
soned that in the absence of an initial duty to drain the land, the
Board was not required to act with reasonable care and diligence
when it did intervene, but needed only to avoid aggravating the sit-
uation.11 9 In the public-authority context, the court thus reached a
result contrary to that in the private context, yet the law defined
the problem in the two contexts as the same.
The problem is that the two contexts are in fact different. The
argument against imposing a duty to act on administrative bodies is
not one concerned with individual liberty as reflected in the pres-
voluntary assumption of responsibility in Hedley Byrne v. Heller, [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.).
The language of "voluntary assumption of duty," however, is merely an alternative way of
expressing the conclusion that there should be liability, not a justification of it. In Hedley
Byrne, the criterion of voluntary assumption of responsibility is coupled with the causing
of a loss through detrimental reliance. It is precisely the absence of detrimental reliance
that makes the problem one of nonfeasance rather than misfeasance.
117. Horsley v. MacLaren, 22 D.L.R.3d 545, 561 (Can. 1971) (Laskin, J., dissenting).
118. [1941] A.C. 74 (H.L.). This case has, in effect, been overruled by Anns v. London
Borough of Merton, [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.).
119. The case was applied by both Justices Schroeder and Jessup in Horsley v.
MacLaren, 11 D.L.R.3d 277 (Ont. C.A. 1970). When the case reached the Supreme Court,
Justice Laskin, by contrast, referred to the East Suffolk case as follows: "Whether a case
involving the exercise of statutory powers (but not duties) by a public authority should gov-
ern the issue of liability or non-liability to an injured rescuer is a question that need not be
answered here." Horsley v. MacLaren, 22 D.L.R.3d 545, 561 (Can. 1971) (Laskin, J., dis-
senting).
The American courts have been less deferential, at least to quasi-public authorities, often
requiring utilities and common carriers to render a minimum standard of service. E.g.,
Williams v. Carolina & N.W.R.R., 144 N.C. 498, 57 S.E. 216 (1907); Oklahoma Natural
Gas Co. v. Pack, 186 Okla. 330, 97 P.2d 768 (1939). Contra, Reimann v. Monmouth Consol.
Water Co., 9 N.J. 134, 87 A.2d 325 (1952); Baum v. Somerville Water Works Co., 84
N.J.L. 611, 87 A. 140 (1913).
277
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 90: 247, 1980
ence of contract values. Rather, at stake is the principle that, al-
though administrative authorities, unlike individuals, must act only
for a public purpose, they have-indeed they must have-
significant discretion in deciding how to allocate their resources. A
court should therefore be reluctant to overturn an agency's
statutorily authorized setting of priorities. 120 Once a public body
embarks on a particular project, however, it prima facie indicates
its decision to allocate resources to it, though it was under no obli-
gation to do so. Very rarely would judicial imposition of liability for
the mishandling of a job that the public authority had decided to
undertake constitute a retrospective interference with the opera-
tion of administrative discretion.'
21
Those considerations are irrelevant to the question of an individ-
ual's duty to rescue. Individual liberty as reflected in contract
values, unlike the administrator's discretion to choose a particular
project from a host of possible ones, is not waived at any point be-
fore the aggravation of a harmful condition. Respect for adminis-
trative discretion may justify a court's different treatment of
abstention from action and failure properly to carry through on de-
120. Thus, it would be improper for a public body to refuse to perform its function be-
cause of the fear of liability for negligent performance, and such a decision would be re-
viewable by a court. Anns v. London Borough of Merton, [1978] A.C. 728, 754-55 (H.L.)
(Lord Wilberforce). Lord Salmon, id. at 507, would make such a decision a ground for
administrative law remedies only, not for tort damages.
American courts have shown similar reluctance to second-guess government allocation of
resources, usually finding no liability for inaction. See K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT
§ 25.04 (1972). But see Runkel v. City of New York, 282 A.D. 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485
(1953) (city liable for building collapse when official had earlier ordered it repaired or de-
molished but failed to carry out the order).
121. For example, it might be onerous for a municipality to have to inspect the founda-
tions of every building being constructed within its boundaries, and it would be improper
for a court to order the inspection of one building rather than another. But once the mu-
nicipality exercises its discretion by embarking on a particular inspection, an inspector's
negligence could not be covered by an immunity attaching to the municipality's discretion.
See McCrea v. City of White Rock, 56 D.L.R.3d 525 (B.C.C.A. 1974); Arms v. London Bor-
ough of Merton, [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.).
Similarly, although a valid public purpose may be served by refusing to commit the fire
brigade to a particular fire, it does not follow that once the fire brigade is sent to the
scene, it may sit around and watch the fire spread. See Veach v. City of Phoenix, 102 Ariz.
195, 427 P.2d 335 (1967) (city has no duty to provide fire protection, but having assumed
responsibility, it may not discriminate among property owners). But see Stevens-Willson v.
City of Chatham, [1933] 2 D.L.R. 407 (Ont. C.A.), aff'd sub nom. Stevens & Willson v.
Chatham, [1934] 3 D.L.R. 1 (Can.) (firemen merely engaged in nonfeasance and thus mu-
nicipality not liable). In County of Parkland No. 31 v. Stetar, 50 D.L.R.3d 376 (Can. 1974),
it was held that, although a municipality is not required to put up a particular traffic-
warning sign, once it is up, it must be maintained. Of course, a public authority can change
a decision once made if the change is itself an exercise of discretion for a public purpose.
E.g., Sheppard v. Glossop Corp., [1921] 3 K.B. 132 (C.A.) (municipal council cut back on
street lighting in order to save money).
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cisions once made. For the individual, starting and continuing a
rescue are not similarly separable.
A legal duty to rescue would involve the recognition of an obliga-
tion to confer a benefit on a person whose plight is not the result of
one's own actions. The traditional objection to the judicial enuncia-
tion of such a duty has been that coerced service for another inter-
feres with personal liberty. The burden of this section has been to
show that, to the extent that the notion of personal liberty is re-
flected in the values associated with liberty of contract, the imposi-
tion of a duty to effect an easy rescue in situations where such
values are absent does not significantly violate personal liberty.
Such a legal requirement of rescue would correspond to existing
restrictions on the power to contract. It remains for the final sec-
tion of this article to argue that the two principal philosophical tra-
ditions in our legal culture both provide affirmative arguments for
the creation of the duty. Together with the observations that the
special-relationship exceptions seem to be eroding the general rule
and that even the defenders of the general rule admit the existence
of a moral duty of easy rescue, this argument suggests that the re-
fusal of the common law to impose a duty of easy rescue is an
anomaly that can and should be corrected.
IV. Philosophical Foundations for a Duty of Easy Rescue
This article has been concerned with the interplay between our
moral intuitions and various aspects of the legal structure. The dis-
tinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance was accepted as a
suitable starting point that required elucidation rather than justifi-
cation. Also accepted was the intuition that failure to effect an easy
rescue was morally reprehensible. From these premises, the article
criticized arguments supporting the legal order's refusal to reflect
the moral intuition about rescue, and argued that a legal duty of
easy rescue would fit into a coherent pattern formed by a miscel-
lany of doctrines in the common law of contract and of tort.
Having eliminated objections to a legal duty of easy rescue, and
shown its compatibility with existing doctrines, the final section of
the article puts forth arguments for the adoption of such a duty.
To this end, the section attempts to give philosophical specificity to
to the moral sentiment that condemns a failure to effect an easy
rescue. Attention is devoted to the two traditions of moral philoso-
phy represented by Kant and by Bentham, for those traditions
have dominated efforts of the last two centuries to explicate and
systematize our moral notions. If the law is to be "the witness and
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external deposit of our moral life,"122 the demonstration that both
traditions provide support for a duty of easy rescue implies that
the absence of a duty to rescue at common law is an aberration that
should be corrected.
Consideration of the utilitarian approach towards rescue must
begin with Jeremy Bentham's thought on the problem. "[I]n cases
where the person is in danger," he asked, "why should it not be
made the duty of every man to save another from mischief, when it
can be done without prejudicing himself ... ?-123 Bentham sup-
ported the implicit answer to this question with several illustra-
tions: using water at hand to quench a fire in a woman's head-
dress; moving a sleeping drunk whose face is in a puddle; warning
a person about to carry a lighted candle into a room strewn with
gunpowder. Bentham clearly had in mind a legal duty that would
be triggered by the combination of the victim's emergency and the
absence of inconvenience to the rescuer-that is, by the features of
most of the proposed reforms requiring rescue.' 24 Unfortunately,
the rhetorical question was the whole of Bentham's argument for
his position. With this question, Bentham appealed directly to his
reader's moral intuition; he did not show how his proposed duty
can be derived through his distinctive felicific calculus.'
25
Can one supply the Benthamite justification that Bentham him-
self omitted? Because the avoidance of injury or death126 obviously
contributes to the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the
difficulties revolve not around the basic requirement of rescue but
around the limitations placed upon that requirement by the no-
tions of emergency and absence of inconvenience. Those limita-
tions have no parallel with respect to participation in putting others
at risk; they apply only in cases of nonfeasance. Indeed, Bentham's
comments come in a section of his Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation that distinguishes beneficence (increasing an-
122. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897).
123. J. BENTHAM, supra note 12, at 293; see 1 J. BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLA-
TION 85-86 (R. Hildreth ed. 1840).
124. See note 17 supra.
125. See J. BENTHAM, supra note 12, at 38-41. That something is askew in Bentham's
analysis is indicated by his statement that for many beneficent acts, "the beneficial quality
of the act depends essentially upon the disposition of the agent; that is, upon the motives
by which he appears to have been prompted to perform it." Id. at 322. In utilitarian
theory, however, there is no such thing as a good or bad motive, only motives that cause
good or bad acts. See id. at 97-130; J.S. MILL, supra note 50, at 26-27.
126. On the controversy over the significance of death for classical utilitarianism, see
Henson, Utilitarianism and the Wrongness of Killing, 80 PHIL. REv. 320 (1971); Sumner, A
Matter of Life and Death, 10 Nous 145 (1976).
280
Duty to Rescue
other's happiness) from probity (forbearing to diminish another's
happiness). Yet Bentham had earlier contended that the distinction
between acts of omission and acts of commission was of no signifi-
cance. 127 The utilitarian's only concern is that an individual bring
about a situation that results in a higher surplus of pleasure over
pain than would any of the alternative situations that his actions
could produce. Consequences are important; how they are reached
is not. The distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance has
no place in this theory, and neither would the rescue duty's emer-
gency or convenience limitations, which apply only after that dis-
tinction is made.
One solution to the apparent inconsistency between the rescue
limitations and Benthamite theory's regard only for consequences
is to drop the conditions of emergency and convenience as limita-
tions on the duty to rescue. The position could be taken that there
is an obligation to rescue whenever rescuing would result in
greater net happiness than not rescuing. This principle, it is impor-
tant to observe, cannot really be a principle about rescuing as that
concept is generally understood. As a matter of common usage, a
rescue presupposes the existence of an emergency, of a predica-
ment that poses danger of greater magnitude and imminence than
one ordinarily encounters. The proposed principle, however, re-
quires no emergency to trigger a duty to act. The principle, in fact,
is one of beneficence, not rescue, and should be formulated more
generally to require providing aid whenever it will yield greater net
happiness than not providing aid.
Eliminating the limitations regarding emergency and conven-
ience might transform a requirement of rescue conceived along
utilitarian lines into a requirement of perfect and general altru-
ism. 128 This demand of perfect altruism would be undesirable for
several reasons. First, it would encourage the obnoxious character
known to the law as the officious intermeddler. Also, its imposi-
tion of a duty of continual saintliness and heroism is unrealistic.
Moreover, it would overwhelm the relationships founded on
friendship and love as well as the distinction between the praise-
worthy and the required; it would thereby obscure some efficient
ways, in the utilitarian's eyes, of organizing and stimulating benefi-
cence. 12' Finally, and most fundamentally, it would be self-
defeating. The requirement of aid assumes that there is some other
127. See J. BENTHAM, supra note 12, at 74-83.
128. This position was espoused by the utilitarian William Godwin. See note 65 supra.
129. See H. SIDGWICK, supra note 52, at 492-93.
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person who has at least a minimal core of personhood as well as
projects of his own that the altruist can further. In a society of per-
fect and general altruism, however, any potential recipient of aid
would himself be an altruist, who must, accordingly, subordinate
the pursuit of his own projects to the rendering of aid to others.
No one could claim for his own projects the priority that would
provide others with a stable object of their altruistic ministrations.
Each person would continually find himself obligated to attempt to
embrace a phantom.130
Although the utilitarian principle that requires the provision of
aid whenever it will result in greater net happiness than failure to
aid easily slips into the pure-altruism duty, it need not lead to so
extreme a position. The obvious alternative interpretation of the
principle is that aid is not obligatory whenever the costs to one's
own projects outweigh the benefits to the recipient's. This interpre-
tation avoids the embracing-of-phantoms objection to pure altru-
ism, but it is subject to all the other criticisms of the purer theory.
Because the cost-benefit calculus is so difficult to perform in partic-
ular instances, the duty would remain ill-defined. In many cases,
therefore, it would encourage the officious intermeddler, seem
unrealistically to require saintliness, overwhelm friendship and
love, and obliterate the distinction between the praiseworthy and
the required. Moreover, the vagueness of the duty would lead
many individuals unhappily and inefficiently to drop their own
projects in preference for those of others.
A different formulation of the rescue duty is needed to harness
and temper the utilitarian impulses toward altruism and to direct
them more precisely toward an intelligible goal. One important
weakness of a too-generally beneficent utilitarianism is that it
tempts one to consider only the immediate consequences of partic-
ular acts, and not the longer term consequences, the most impor-
tant of which are the expectations generated that such acts will con-
tinue. If, as the classical utilitarians believed, 131 the general
happiness is advanced when people engage in productive activities
that are of value to others, the harm done by a duty of general be-
neficence, in either version discussed above, would override its spe-
cific benefits. The deadening of industry resulting from both reli-
ance on beneficence and devotion to beneficence would in the long
130. J. RAWLS, supra note 104, at 189; cf. C. FRIED, supra note 14, at 15 (crude
consequentialist position can lead to paralysis, obsession, and contradiction).
131. E.g., J. BENTHAM, Principles of the Civil Code, in 1 WORKS 303-04 (J. Bowring ed.
1843).
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run be an evil greater than the countenancing of individual in-
stances of unfulfilled needs or wants. "In all cases of helping,"
wrote John Stuart Mill, in a passage concerned only with the reli-
ance costs,
there are two sets of consequences to be considered: the conse-
quences of the assistance and the consequences of relying on
the assistance. The former are generally beneficial, but the lat-
ter, for the most part, injurious .... There are few things for
which it is more mischievous that people should rely on the ha-
bitual aid of others than for the means of subsistence, and un-
happily there is no lesson which they more easily learn.'
32
Utilitarianism can use the notion of reliance to restrict the re-
quirement of beneficence. If an act of beneficence would tend to
induce reliance on similar acts, it should be avoided. If the act of
beneficence does not have this tendency, it should be performed as
long as the benefit produced is greater than the cost of perfor-
mance. In the latter case, there are no harmful effects on industry
flowing from excessive reliance to outweigh the specific benefits.
This rule can account for Bentham's restriction of the duty to res-
cue to situations of emergency. People do not regularly expose
themselves to extraordinary dangers in reliance on the relief that
may be available if the emergency materializes, and only a fool
would deliberately court a peril because he or others had previ-
ously been rescued from a similar one. As Sidgwick put it, an emer-
gency rescue "will have no bad effect on the receiver, from the ex-
ceptional nature of the emergency.' 33  Furthermore, an
emergency is not only a desperate situation; it is also a situation
that deviates from society's usual pattern. The relief of an emer-
gency is therefore unlikely to induce reliance on the assistance of
others in normal conditions. The abnormality of emergencies also
means that rescuers can confidently pursue their own projects un-
der normal circumstances. The motive for industry that Bentham
located in each person's needs is not undermined by extraordinary
and isolated events.
The role of emergency in the utilitarian obligation to rescue cor-
responds to, and illuminates, the definition of a legal duty to res-
cue by reference to the absence of contract values, as set out in the
previous section. Utilitarian philosophy and the concept of the
132. J.S. MILL, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 967 (W. Ashley ed. 1923).
133. H. SIDGWICK, supra note 52, at 437.
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market are closely related. 34 Both regard individuals as max-
imizers of their own happiness, and both see the use of contracts to
acquire and to exchange property as conducive to the public good.
Contract law's refusal to enforce certain transactions sets them
apart from the usual structure of relationships, in which the satis-
faction of the parties' needs and desires can legitimately serve as a
stimulus to exchange. The person who sees a member of his own
family in difficulty and the police officer who notices a hazard on
the highway may not act as ordinary members of the market with
respect to those endangered. Those pockets of contractual non-
enforcement are sufficiently isolated that they are unlikely to be
generalized: they will not generate a widespread reliance on assis-
tance or sense of obligation to assist in settings where market ex-
changes are permitted and common.
An emergency is similar. Contract values are absent in such a sit-
uation because the assistance required is of such a kind that it can-
not be purchased on ordinary commercial terms. Suspension of
contract values in an emergency will not result in a general deaden-
ing of individual industry; the utilitarian can therefore confine his
calculus to the specific consequences of the rescue. The denial of
relief to the Southwark squatters 35 is a case in point. The desper-
ate situation there was a consequence of poverty and not an ex-
traordinary condition that deviated from the ordinary pattern of
contemporary existence. The utilitarian must be concerned in that
situation that judicially coercing individual assistance to the poor
will generate a reliance whose harmful effects will, in the long run
and across society as a whole, outweigh the benefits of the specific
assistance.
Bentham's intuitive restriction of beneficence to situations of
emergency can thus be supported on utilitarian grounds. Is the
same true of the inconvenience limitation? As with the emergency
restriction, finding utilitarian support requires looking behind the
specific action to its social and legal context. For the utilitarian, the
enforcement of a duty through legal sanctions is always an evil,
which can be justified only to avoid a greater evil. If the sanction is
applied, the offender suffers the pain of punishment. If the pros-
pect of t he sanction is sufficient to deter conduct, those deterred
suffer the detriment of frustrated preferences. Moreover, the ap-
134. The relationship has been noticed by critics of both. See, e.g., C. MACPHERSON,
DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL 4 (1973); Marx & Engels, The German Ideology,
in KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS 185 (D. McLellan ed. 1977).
135. London Borough of Southwark v. Williams, [1971] 2 All E.R. 175 (C.A.).
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paratus of enforcement siphons off social resources from other
projects promoting the general happiness.
Accordingly, a utilitarian will be restrained and circumspect in
the elaboration of legal duties. In particular, he will not pitch a
standard of behavior at too high a level: the higher the standard,
the more onerous it will be to the person subjected to it, the greater
the pleasure that he must forego in adhering to it, and the greater
his resistance to its demands. A high standard entails both more se-
vere punishment and a more elaborate apparatus of detection and
enforcement. Applied to the rescue situation, this reasoning
implies that some convenience restriction should be adopted as
part of the duty. Compelling the rescuer to place himself in phys-
ical danger, for instance, would be inefficacious, to use Bentham's
terminology, because such coercion cannot influence the will: "the
evil, which he sees himself about to undergo.., is so great that the
evil denounced by the penal clause ... cannot appear greater."'
136
Limiting the duty of rescue to emergency situations where the res-
cue will not inconvenience the rescuer-as judicial decisions would
elaborate that limitation and thus give direction to individ-
uals-minimizes both the interference with the rescuer's own pref-
erences and the difficulties of enforcement that would result from
recalcitrance. Bentham's second limitation can thus also be sup-
ported on a utilitarian basis.
The utilitarian arguments for the duty to rescue and for the limi-
tations on that duty rest primarily on administrative considerations.
The arguments focus not so much on the parties and their duties
as persons as on the difficulties that might be created throughout
the whole range of societal interactions. The elements of the duty
are evaluated in terms of their likely consequences, no matter how
remote. In the convenience limitation, for instance, whether the
rescuer ought to feel aggrieved at the requirements of a high
standard is of no concern. The likelihood that he will feel ag-
grieved is all that matters: for the Benthamite utilitarian, general
happiness is the criterion of evaluation and not itself an object of
evaluation. 137 Moreover, recalcitrance necessitates more costly en-
136. J. BFNTHAM, supra note 12, at 162 (footnote omitted).
137. Id. at 13. For Bentham, the pleasures of good will count equally with the pleasures
of malevolence. See id. at 44. Bentham wrote:
Let a man's motive be ill-will; call it even malice, envy, cruelty; it is still a kind of pleas-
ure that is his motive: the pleasure he takes at the thought of the pain which he sees,
or expects to see, his adversary undergo. Now even this wretched pleasure taken by it-
self, is good: it may be faint; it may be short: it must at any rate be impure: yet while
285
The Yale Law Journal
forcement, and that consequence must also enter the calculus. The
same is true for the emergency limitation. The argument for that
limitation focused on the possibility that a particular instance of as-
sistance would, by example, induce socially detrimental general re-
liance or beneficence. This use of example does not explore either
the fairness of singling out particular persons for particular treat-
ment or the consistency and scope of certain principles. Rather, the
argument examines the cumulative consequences of repetition, and
decides whether a particular person should perform a particular
act on the basis of the act's implications for the entire society's mar-
ket arrangements.
At least one philosopher has argued that administrative consid-
erations of this sort are not moral ones at all, or that they are moral
only in a derivative sense.' 38 In this view, the administrative and
enforcement considerations on which the utilitarian account of res-
cue rests are irrelevant to the individual's obligations as a moral
agent. The individual should ask what he ought to do, not how
others can compel him to fulfill his duty.13 9 The merit of this view
is its observation that any utilitarian version of a duty to rescue has
nuances that do not ring true to the moral contours of the situa-
tion. The person in need of rescue stands in danger of serious
physical injury or loss of life, harms not quite comparable by any
quantitative measure to other losses of happiness. Health and life
are not merely components of the aggregate of goods that an indi-
vidual enjoys. Rather, they are constitutive of the individual, who
partakes of them in a unique and intimate way; they are the pre-
conditions for the enjoyment of other goods. 1 40 Moreover, there is
something false in viewing an act of rescue as a contribution to the
greatest happiness of the greatest number.' 4' If there is an obliga-
it lasts, and before any bad consequences arrive, it is as good as any other that is not
more intense.
Id. at 100 n.e. Mill's attempt to modify this position is notorious. See J.S. MILL, supra note
50, at 26-31.
138. See Fried, supra note 58, at 182.
139. Fried traces this view back to Kant. Id. Bentham, however, also comes close to this
view in his distinction between private ethics and the art of government. See J. BENTHAM,
supra note 12, at 285. But a utilitarian justification of rescue that ignores administrative
considerations merely leads back to excessive beneficence.
140. See C. FRIED, MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION: PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND SOCIAL PoLIcY
95-96 (1974); I. KANT, supra note 76, at 112. The distinctive quality of physical integrity
relative to the goods of property also lies at the root of Hume's account of justice. See D.
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 489 (2d ed. L. Selby-Bigge 1978).
141. A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 218 (1978); Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L.
REv. 1057, 1076 (1975).
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tion to rescue, it is owed to particular persons rather than to the
greatest number. Any such duty would require the rescuing not
only of the eminent heart surgeon but also of the hermit bachelor;
and even the duty to rescue the heart surgeon would be owed pri-
marily to him, not to his present or prospective patients.
Because the utilitarian account of rescue thus appears to lack an
important moral ingredient, and because utilitarianism is not the
law's only important philosophical tradition, it is worth attempting
to outline a non-utilitarian version of the obligation to rescue. Al-
though the two approaches support the same conclusion, the argu-
ments are different in texture. 142 In particular, the non-utilitarian
argument recognizes the distinctive importance of avoiding phys-
ical injury or death; it resists the assimilation of health and life to
other goods. This attention to the centrality of the person avoids
the utilitarian dilemma of either demanding excessive beneficence
or having recourse to administrative considerations, which shifts
the focus away from the rescuer's obligation to a particular endan-
gered individual. In the non-utilitarian argument, of course,
administrative considerations are not ignored; to do so would be
impossible in elaborating an argument that attempts to provide an
ethical foundation for a judicially enforced duty to rescue.
Nonetheless, the non-utilitarian's use of administrative considera-
tions differs from the utilitarian's. The utilitarian weaves the fabric
of the duty to rescue out of administrative strands; the cost of ad-
ministration and enforcement are relevant to the very existence of
the duty. The non-utilitarian, by contrast, justifies a legal duty to
rescue independently of the administrative costs; the mechanisms
of enforcement are invoked only to structure and to coordinate the
operation of the duty.
The deontological argument begins with the observation that the
idea of an individual's being under a moral duty is intimately re-
lated to the notion that health and life are of distinctive impor-
tance. The concept of duty applies only to an individual endowed
with the capacity to make choices and to set ends for himself.
143
Further, the person, as a purposive and choosing entity, does not
merely set physical integrity as one of his ends; he requires it as a
precondition to the accomplishment of the purposes that his free-
dom gives him the power to set. As Kant put it, physical integrity is
142. See Fried, supra note 58, at 182-84.
143. The concept of duty does not apply to creatures that act out of necessity. I. KANT,
CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 28 (L. Beck trans. 1956); I. KANT, supra note 16, at 78-102.
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"the basic stuff (the matter) in man without which he could not real-
ize his ends.' 44
A person contemplating the ethical exercise of his freedom of ac-
tion must impose certain restrictions on that freedom. Because mo-
rality is something he shares with all humanity, 45 he cannot claim
a preferred moral position for himself. Any moral claim he makes
must, by its very nature as a moral claim, be one to which he is sub-
ject when others can assert it. Acting on the basis of his own
personhood therefore demands recognition of the personhood of
others. This recognition, however, cannot be elaborated in the first
instance in terms of the enjoyment of ordinary material goods. Be-
cause no conception of happiness is shared by everyone and is con-
stant throughout any individual's life, the universal concept of
personhood cannot be reflected in a system of moral duties di-
rected at the satisfaction of unstable desires for such goods.1
46
Physical integrity, by contrast, is necessary for the accomplishment
of any human aim, and so is an appropriate subject for a system of
mutually restraining duties.
An individual contemplating his actions from a moral point of
view must recognize that all others form their projects on a
substratum of physical integrity. If he claims the freedom to pur-
sue his projects as a moral right, he cannot as a rational and moral
agent deny to others the same freedom. Because his claim to that
freedom implies a right to the physical integrity that is necessary to
its exercise, he must concede to others the right to physical integ-
rity that he implicitly and inevitably claims for himself.'
47
This conception of the right to life and health derives from the
notion of personhood that is presupposed by the concept of moral
action. So too do the right's natural limitations. The duty of benefi-
cence exacted by this right need not collapse into a comprehensive
144. I. KANT, supra note 76, at 112.
145. The parable of the Good Samaritan, Luke 10:30, itself emphasizes in its opening
formulation that the only relevant quality of the man who fell among the robbers was that
he was a human being. See E. CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION 195 (1955).
146. See I. KANT, supra note 143, at 27.
147. The argument leans heavily on the work of Professor Alan Gewirth. See A.
GEWIRTH, supra note 141; Gewirth, The 'Is-Ought' Problem Resolved, 47 PROC. & ADDRESSES
AMER. PHIL. ASS'N 34 (1974); Gewirth, The Normative Structure of Action, 25 REv. META-
PHYSICS 238 (1971). My purpose is more modest than his in one crucial respect: it is
enough for my purpose that a person who assumes a moral point of view would elaborate
a deontological justification of rescue, whereas Gewirth argues that a rational actor must
assume the moral point of view. For discussion of this wider claim, see Grunebaum, Gevirth
and a Reluctant Protagonist, 86 ETHICS 274 (1976); Veatch, Paying Heed to Gewirth's Principle
of Categorial Consistency, 86 ETHICS 278 (1976); Gewirth, Action and Rights: A Reply, 86 ETH-
iCs 288 (1976).
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and self-defeating altruism. Respect for another's physical security
does not entail foregoing one's own. 148 The right to life and health,
seen to give content to the universal concept of personhood, must
be ascribed not only to others, but also to oneself. As Kant put it,
since all other men with the exception of myself would not be
all men, and the maxim would then not have the universality
of a law, as it must have in order to be obligatory, the law
prescribing the duty of benevolence will include myself, as the
object of benevolence, in the command of practical reason.
149
Moreover, the universalizing process radiates outward from the ac-
tor: it is only one's desire to act that makes necessary the explora-
tion of the action's implicit claims and thus of the rights that he
must rationally concede to others.' 50 The priority of the actor is
thus embedded in the structure of the argument and should be re-
flected in the concrete duties that the argument yields.
This outline of deontological analysis can be applied to examine
the standard suggestion that the common law should recognize a
duty to effect an easy rescue. Such a duty would be the judicial an-
alogue of the moral obligation to respect the person of another and
to safeguard his physical integrity, which is necessary for whatever
aims he chooses to pursue. The emergency and convenience limita-
tions also fit quite readily into the analysis. An emergency is a par-
ticularly imminent threat to physical security, and the convenience
limitation reflects the rescuer's entitlement to the priority of his
own physical security over that of the endangered person. Al-
though the proposed legal duty fits comfortably within the deonto-
logical moral duty of beneficence, however, the two are not co-
extensive. Emergencies are not the only circumstances in which life
and health are threatened; disease, starvation, and poverty can af-
fect the physical substratum of personhood on a routine basis. If
148. See I. KANT, supra note 76, at 53, 122.
149. Id. at 118.
150. Kant wrote:
[R]ational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as
being so: so far then this is a subjective principle of human actions. But every other ra-
tional being regards its existence similarly, just on the same principle that holds for
me; so that it is at the same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme prac-
tical law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced.
I. KANT, supra note 16, at 46 (footnote omitted). For the problems of interpretation in this
passage, see H. JONES, KANT'S PRINCIPLE OF PERSONALITY 20-26 (1971); Haezrahi, The Con-
cept of Man as an End-in-Himself, in I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
WITH CRITICAL ESSAYS 292 (L. Beck trans. R. Wolff ed. 1969). On the priority of the self,
see I. KANT, supra note 76, at 119; Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lauer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.I. 1060, 1070 (1976).
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legal duties must reflect moral ones, should not a legal duty to res-
cue be supplemented by a legal duty to alleviate those less isolated
abridgments of physical security?
The convenience limitation on the rescue duty might similarly be
loosened in a deontological analysis. One tempting extension
would be very far-reaching: if the physical substratum is the "basic
stuff (the matter) in man without which he could not realize his
ends,"'15 and if we are under a duty to safeguard that substratum
in others as in ourselves, the priority that the rescuer can legiti-
mately grant to himself can be only with respect to his physical in-
tegrity. Under this extension, a rescuer could-indeed would be
obligated to-abstain from acting only if the act would place him in
physical danger; if it would not put him in danger, he would be
required to attempt a rescue, no matter what the disruption of his
life. In Macaulay's famous example, 152 the surgeon would have to
travel from Calcutta to Meerut to perform an operation that only
he could perform, because the journey, though inconvenient,
would not be dangerous. Indeed, he would have to make the trip
even if he were about to leave for Europe or to greet members of
his family arriving on an incoming ship. The patient's right to
physical security would rank ahead of the satisfaction of the sur-
geon's contingent desires.
The deontological approach to rescue does not compel such a
drastic extension. Although every moral person must value phys-
ical integrity, its protection is not an end in itself. Rather, physical
security is valued because it allows individuals to realize their own
projects and purposes. Whatever the reach of the right to physical
integrity, therefore, it must allow the rescuer to satisfy his purposes
in a reasonably coherent way.' 53 Still, though the extension of the
moral duty cannot be so drastic as to require the sacrifice of all of
a person's projects, it can be substantial. It can require the res-
cuer to undergo considerable inconvenience short of fundamental
changes in the fabric of his life. The deontological duty relaxes
both the emergency and convenience limitations of the duty of easy
rescue in emergencies: it applies not only in emergencies but when-
ever physical integrity is threatened, and it applies even when the
rescuer might have to undergo considerable inconveniences. The
duty might, after all, obligate Macaulay's surgeon to travel from
Calcutta to Meerut. Would it also require the wealthy to use at least
151. I. KANT, supra note 76, at 112.
152. See p. 272 supra.
153. A similar point is made by Professor Fried in C. FRIED, supra note 14, at 123.
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some of their resources to alleviate the plight of the starving and
the afflicted? For those concerned about the possibility of setting
principled limits to a duty of rescue, 154 the question is critical.
The objection to an affirmative answer to the question rests on
the premises that even the wealthy are under no obligation to be
charitable and that the afflicted have no right to receive charity.
Under the deontological theory, those premises are incorrect. The
duty of beneficence derives from the concept of personhood; it is
therefore not properly called charity, for the benefactor's perfor-
mance of this duty is no reason for self-congratulation. 155 Al-
though the duty is an imperfect one-"since no determinate limits
can be assigned to what should be done, the duty has in it a play-
room for doing more or less, ' 5 6 as Kant said-it is nonetheless a
duty to the performance of which the recipient is entitled.
The extent of the duty of beneficence, of course, can still be
troubling. It is the indeterminateness of the duty, the "play-room,"
that is particularly relevant to this problem. Kant meant by this ex-
pression that the form and the amount of the benefaction would
vary, depending on the resources of the benefactor, the identity of
the recipient, and the recipient's own conception of happiness.
57
The indeterminateness, however, applies not only to the form of
the benefaction but also to the linking of particular benefactors to
particular beneficiaries. Why should any particular person be
singled out of the whole group of potential benefactors, and why
should the benefit be conferred on one rather than another person
in need? If a duty "may be exacted from a person, as one exacts a
debt,"'1 58 it is a debt that leaves unclear the precise terms of dis-
charge as well as the identities of obligor and obligee.
The proper response to this indeterminacy is not to deny that
there is a duty. What is required is to set up social institutions to
perform the necessary tasks of coordination and determination.
Those institutions would ensure that no person is singled out un-
fairly either for burdens or for benefits, and that the forms of ben-
efaction correlate both with the resources of those who give and
with the needs of those who receive. In fact, all Western democra-
cies undertake to perform this task through programs for social as-
sistance. The institutions they establish, however, are primarily leg-
154. E.g., Epstein Theory, supra note 14, at 198-99.
155. I. KANT, supra note 76, at 54; see J.S. MILL, supra note 50, at 74-75.
156. See I. KANT, supra note 76, at 121.
157. See M. GREGOR, LAWS OF FREEDOM 95-1 12, 194-96 (1963).
158. J.S. MILL, supra note 50, at 232-33.
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islative and administrative; precisely because a general duty of
beneficence is imperfect, it cannot be judicially enforced. The tra-
ditional claim-settling function of courts does not permit the trans-
fer of a resource from one person to another solely because the
former has it and the latter needs it. Such judicial action would un-
fairly prefer one needy person over others159 and unfairly burden
one resourceful person over others. Because the duty of benefi-
cence is general and indeterminate, it does not, in the absence of
legislative action that specifies and coordinates, yield judicially en-
forceable moral claims by individuals against others.
The significant characteristic of the emergency and convenience
limitations is that, in combination, they eliminate the "play-room"
inherent in the duty of beneficence, thus providing a principled re-
sponse to Kant and to Epstein and rendering the narrower duty to
rescue appropriate for judicial enforcement. An emergency marks
a particular person as physically endangered in a way that is not
general or routine throughout the society. An imminent peril can-
not await assistance from the appropriate social institutions. The
provision of aid to an emergency victim does not deplete the social
resources committed to the alleviation of more routine threats to
physical integrity. Moreover, aid in such circumstances presents no
unfairness problems in singling out a particular person to receive
the aid. Similarly, emergency aid does not unfairly single out one
of a class of routinely advantaged persons; the rescuer just hap-
pens to find himself for a short period in a position, which few if
any others share, to render a service to some specific person. In ad-
dition, when a rescue can be accomplished without a significant dis-
ruption of his own projects, the rescuer's freedom to realize his
own ends is not abridged by the duty to preserve the physical secu-
rity of another. 160 In sum, when there is an emergency that the res-
cuer can alleviate with no inconvenience to himself, the general
duty of beneficence that is suspended over society like a floating
charge is temporarily revealed to identify a particular obligor and
obligee, and to define obligations that are specific enough for judi-
cial enforcement.
159. The unfairness of preferring the squatters to other homeless persons was adverted
to by Lord Justice Megaw in London Borough of Southwark v. Williams, [1971] 2 All E.R.
175, 182 (C.A.) (Megaw, L.J.).
160. In I. KANT, supra note 76, at 49, Kant writes: "Imperfect duties, accordingly, are
only duties of virtue. To fulfill them is merit (meritum = +a); but to transgress them is not so
much guilt (demeritum = -a) as rather mere lack of moral worth (= 0), unless the agent
makes it his principle not to submit to these duties." Is not a person who refuses to rescue
another at no cost to himself "making it his principle not to submit to these duties?"
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Conclusion
The problem of rescue is a central issue in the controversies
about the relationships between law and morality, between contract
and tort, and between utilitarian and deontological ethics. The ar-
gument of this article has been that tort law's adoption of a duty of
easy rescue in emergencies would fit a common-law pattern, found
principally in contract law, that gives expression to the law's under-
standing of liberty. This pattern reveals that the common law is al-
ready instinct with the attitude of benevolence on which a duty to
rescue is grounded. The attitude of benevolence is accepted by
many legal commentators as a basic moral intuition, yet the partic-
ular duty proposed in this article can be systematically elaborated
in both the utilitarian and deontological traditions. For those who
believe that law should attempt to render concrete the notion of
ethical dealing between persons, as well as for those concerned
about the method of common-law evolution or about the social
costs of legal rules, the article provides an argument for changing
the common-law rule on rescue.
